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ABSTRACT
Durkheim's and Weber's perspectives on action and order are compared 
by adding the concept of role to Kreps' theory of organization and 
disaster. Kreps defines organization as the co-presence of 4 individually 
necessary elements— domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities 
(A). His resulting taxonomy of forms of association includes 24 possible 
combinations of all 4 elements (D-T-R-A to A-R-T-D). The taxonomy 
represents the paradox of social structure as either a problem of action 
or a problem of order. When order is referenced, the paradox is expressed 
well by Durkheim and the idea of role-making. When action is referenced, 
the paradox is stated nicely by Weber and the idea of role-playing. The 
dynamics of role-making and role-playing at the origins of organization, 
then, reveals social structure as both Weberian social creation and 
Durkheimian force.
Kreps depicts the unity of action and order in a normally distributed 
metric of the the 24 organizational forms in the taxonomy. The six 
midpoint forms in the metric (D-A-R-T, T-R-A-D, T-A-D-R, R-D-A-T, R-T-D-A, 
A-D-T-R) point to a tension or balancing of the forces of order and 
action. Detailed analyses of role-making and role-playing for these 
midpoint forms are the focus of this research (38 cases of an original 
sample of 423 instances of organization from 15 disaster events). Four 
criteria are developed to distinguish between role-making, mix role-making 
and role-playing, and role-playing at each stage of the origins of 
organization (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements present). Marginal distributions of 
role variables point to an expected increase m  role-playing as each 
additional element of organization is enacted. However, the progressive 
character of role-playing is grounded, in no small way, by emergent 
improvisations. These improvisations are indicative of role-making. Role 
dynamics are analyzed on their own terms and also as they relate to 
physical, social, and temporal characteristics of the response and 
emergency. Correlation and regression analyses indicate that role-making 
and role-playing must be seen as parts of a broader structural drama. The 
structural drama of disaster informs even as it is anticipated by the 
respective theories of Durkheim and Weber.
DISASTER, ACTION, AND ORDER 
A SUBSTANTIVE INQUIRY OF WEBER AND DURKHEIM
INTRODUCTION: A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO STRUCTURE
The conceptual focus of sociology suggests a basic dualism.
Sometimes primary attention is given to the human actor as prime mover of 
social structure. At other times the emphasis is on some notion of an 
external structure— one which is real, apart from the actor, and 
constrains his behavior. Whether seen as forever becoming or always 
there, social structure therefore exists for every sociological analyst as 
the subject matter of the discipline. To assume existence of something is 
not necessarily to know what it is. In the end, sociology is to social 
structure as physics is to physical structure. For both disciplines the 
subject matter is, to some extent, a mystery. As implied above, the 
creation and maintenance of social structure are seldom discussed within 
the same substantive theory. For example, Blau's (1974; 1977) theory of
the division of labor presents structure as emergent force which maintains 
collective life. This contrasts with Cicourel's (1968; 1974) theory of
juvenile justice which casts structure as an interpretive and 
intersubjective creation. There is a contradiction here and Kreps (1985) 
refers to it as the autonomy and unity of action and order. That 
contradiction, expressed as a problem of describing and explaining 
organization in the disaster context, is the focus of the following 
thesis.
Specifically the thesis builds on Kreps' theory of organization as 
unit and as process. For him structure is represented by the forms of 
human association. He attempts to define these forms and locate them in 
the empirical setting of disaster. The following example illustrates the 
descriptive emphasis from which Kreps develops this theory. Notice his
2
3processual approach as he describes the origins of what he terms an 
instance of organization. As defined by Kreps. activities (A), human and 
material resources (R), tasks (T), and domains (D) represent four basic 
structural elements of organization. Serving as a kind of core species 
concept of organization (McKelvey, 1982), the four elements are seen as 
individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to 
exist. This means that (1) each element is a unique expression of social 
structure, (2) their co-presence establishes the existence of 
organization, and (3) no pattern in their arrangement is necessarily more 
frequent or important. The elements are denoted for easy reference by the 
parenthetical letters (A, R, T, D). Their patternings in organizing 
processes are the foundation of Kreps' theory and its expansion in this 
thesis.
An organization of search and rescue emerges following an 
earthquake. The event takes place without forewarning, is 
regional in scope, destructive in magnitude, and its prompt and 
secondary physical impacts are over within minutes to several 
hours. The central business district and a large residential 
area of a major city are seriously damaged. Immediately 
following impact many individuals who happen to be in or near 
these areas engage in joint actions related to search and rescue 
of victims (A). A few of these early responders have search and 
rescue training. Within an hour many search and rescue teams 
converge on the impacted areas. Both formal and informal, they 
come from city agencies, other municipalities, the military, and 
several voluntary search and rescue groups (R). A task 
structure emerges among some of these disparate groups within 
several hours after impact, with prominent roles played by 
members of a mountain rescue group and members of an emergent 
"damage control" group (T). The legitimacy of an integrated 
search and rescue operation is not officially recognized by city 
government officials until about 12 hours after impact (D). By 
then it is operating, now formally, out of the city's public 
safety building. Formal search and rescue actions continue for 
another 24-30 hours.
4The example suggests an instance of organization that was initiated by 
activities (A), followed by the mobilization of key resources (A-R), which 
led to the development of a set of tasks (A-R-T), and finally to the 
establishment of a formal domain that was officially recognized and 
legitimated within the impacted community (A-R-T-D). The response 
exemplifies an elemental patterning of the origins of organization, 
defined below as an A-R-T-D form of association. Because things are 
happening before there are collective representations of what is going on, 
the origins of organization appear as action-driven. However, alternative 
hypothetical patterns seem equally plausible. If, for example, a domain 
had been declared (D) and tasks socially defined (D-T) prior to the 
mobilization of resources (D-T-R) and performance of activities (D-T-R-A), 
the search and rescue effort would appear as order-driven. In other 
words, collective representations would constrain social action under 
these circumstances. The following example of evacuation during a flood 
illustrates a form of origins that is considered by Kreps as order driven.
D-T-R-A
Evacuation of a potential flood plain is enacted by a fire 
department prior to impact. A river runs through a large 
metropolitan area. A state police unit wires the city fire 
department with information that the river is at flood level, 
that flood waters are causing considerable damage upstream, and 
that flood conditions are expected to reach the city within 
several hours. A fire department communications operator 
contacts the fire chief who then puts the fire department on 
standby alert. The fire department is schooled in evacuation 
procedures through pre-disaster preparedness activities. After 
being notified by the operator, the fire chief goes to the site 
of the initial city police command post and informs police 
personnel of his intention to evacuate low lying manufacturing 
and residential areas of the city. Following this discussion 
there is agreement that the fire department will handle the 
evacuation of selected low lying areas (D). Upon receiving 
additional information from the local police and water
5departments, the chief decides to divide the fire department's 
equipment and personnel into two sections, one on each side of 
the river, to ensure an adequate distribution of resources for 
both evacuation and fire protection. Working through the normal 
chain of command, he orders fire personnel to mobilize and 
relocate people and possessions below 1000 feet from the bank on 
each side of the river (T). Fire department personnel and 
equipment are then deployed according to the chief's dictates 
(R). While the threatened population already has been warned of 
flooding via the mass media, fire department personnel move door 
to door in order to evacuate all residents in the selected 
lowland areas. There is sufficient time prior to flooding to 
both evacuate those threatened and recheck the areas covered. 
Several threatened individuals choose to remain anyway, arguing 
that they must protect or secure their property. Some of those 
who remain are stranded. The evacuation of those stranded by 
high water is then accomplished by using fire department boats. 
As conditions become more severe, larger boats are requested by 
the fire department and several are volunteered. The evacuation 
is terminated shortly after impact when all those stranded have 
been successfully evacuated (A). In the face of considerable 
property damage, there are no deaths or serious injuries 
resulting from the flood.
Kreps conceives the range of forms of organization implied by these 
two examples as a continuum: with D-T-R-A or social order at one end and
A-R-T-D or social action at the other end. Domains (D) legitimate what is 
taking place and tasks (T) collectively represent how it is being done 
(Durkheim, 1938). Kreps interprets them as the structural ends of 
organization. Resources (R) are human attributes and material 
technologies and activities (A) are the joint actions of individuals and 
social units. Kreps interprets these latter two elements as the 
structural means of organization. He argues that each of the four 
elements is independent of the others, thus they all relate equally to 
organization as entity or thing. Their sequential patterning in time and 
space reveals organization as process. From archival data on 15 disaster 
events, Kreps has constructed thus far a data file of 423 instances of 
organization which fall at various points on a continuum of social order
6(D-T-R-A) to social action (A-R-T-D). Table 1 summarizes the distribution 
of these 423 cases. Note that some 39 cases fall at what looks like the 
midpoint of the continuum. Here it appears that no simple judgment can be 
made as to whether the six forms so located are either action-driven or 
order-driven. The following example describes one of these six types.
T-R-A-D
Material resources are mobilized by residents of one 
community and provided to the victims of another. An entire 
region is impacted by a major earthquake. Although several 
communities suffer serious damage, some are spared.
Considerable concern is expressed by residents and leaders of 
one unimpacted city about the adequacy of assistance being 
provided to a small and isolated town that was devastated by 
tsunami that followed the earthquake. A joint meeting involving 
representatives from the unimpacted city's chamber of commerce, 
city government, and the trucking industry takes place on the 
fourth day following the event. A chairman is appointed and 
food, communications, and transportation committees are set up 
(T). At least 50 people are mobilized (R) for the collection of 
food and other commodities in the unimpacted city. A core group 
consisting of the unimpacted city's public works director, 
engineer, and building inspector, as well as a privately 
employed architectural engineer then transport the supplies to 
the impacted town which is some distance away (A). Leaders and 
residents of the devastated town have no knowledge of this 
assistance until it arrives on site. The core group meets with 
some members of the impacted community's town council and offers 
the assistance. The following day the town council meets and 
asks the core group to take over the distribution of its own 
resources as well as perform other community functions (D).
This third example of origins involves the development of a division 
of labor (T), followed by the mobilization of resources (T-R) and the 
performance of joint actions relative to that division of labor (T-R-A), 
and culminated by the legitimation of the domain of action by officials of 
the devastated town (D). Unlike the first two cases, neither ends nor 
means predominate at the origins of organization. Notice how domains and
TABLE 1: Organizational Forms: Total Sample
Organizational Number of Units:
Forms Total Sample
D-T-R-A 167 (167)
D-T-A-R 5
D-R-T-A 53 (59)
T-D-R-A 1
D-R-A-T 27
D-A-T-R 2
T-R-D-A 4 (100)
T-D-A-R -
R-D-T-A 67
D-A-R-T 1
T-R-A-D 21
T-A-D-R - (39)
R-D-A-T 12
R-T-D-A 4
A-D-T-R 1
T-A-R-D -
R-A-D-T 15
R-T-A-D 13 (31)
A-D-R-T 1
A-T-D-R 2
R-A-T-D 13
A-T-R-D 4 (22)
A-R-D-T 5
A-R-T-D 5 (5)
Totals 423 (423)
8tasks independently express the entity quality of organization. Notice 
also the discontinuity between tasks and domain, yet the continuity of 
both with pre-disaster routines. The process described cannot readily be 
interpreted as either order- or action-driven.
In his work Kreps (1985) addresses taxonomic problems of description. 
The above case studies illustrate the importance of elemental attempts to 
create organization. Logically, the patterning of all combinations of 1-4 
of these elements yields a taxonomy of 64 forms of association (see Table 
2). Only the 4-element forms (D-T-R-A to A-R-T-D) are collectively 
sufficient for organiztion to exist (24 organizational forms of 
association). Thus Kreps' taxonomy distinguishes between organization 
(24) and other (40) forms of association.
Kreps expresses the continuum of social order and social action by 
the metric found on Tables 3 and 4. Critical for his analysis, even 
though most (all but 52) of the 423 instances of organization found were 
enacted by established units of various types (i.e., they existed before 
the disaster event) existence is not assumed for purposes of studying the 
process of organization. In effect, the event serves as a social catalyst 
for studying the origins of organization and the rationale is similar to 
that used in chemistry (Dubin, 1978). For Kreps, the life history of 
organization is circumscribed by the event and its aftermath. Within this 
time frame, many existing social units do not act at all or do different 
things. Thus, neither involvement nor its precise character can be 
assumed for these non-routine events. Note, however, that by invoking the 
event as social catalyst, Kreps does not deny the relevance of pre-event 
conditions for what takes place.
9Organizational
Forms
D-T-R-A
D-T-A-R
D-R-A-T
D-R-T-A
D-A-T-R
D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-R-D-A
T-A-D-R
T-A-R-D
T-D-R-A
T-D-A-R
R-A-D-T
R-A-T-D
R-D-T-A
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
R-T-A-D
A-D-T-R
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D
TABLE 2: Taxonomy of Forms of Association*
Three Two One
Element Element Element
Forms Forms Forms
D-T-R D-T D
D-T-A D-R T
D-R-A D-A R
D-R-T T-R A
D-A-T T-A
D-A-R T-D
T-R-A R-A
T-R-D R-D
T-A-D R-T
T-A-R A-D
T-D-R A-T
T-D-A A-R
R-A-D
R-A-T 
R-D-T 
R-D-A 
R-T-D 
R-T-A 
A-D-T 
A-D-R 
A-T-D 
A-T-R 
A-R-D 
A-R-T
*From Kreps (1984b)
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TABLE 3: Organizational Forms: Total Sample
Social Order - Social Action Metric
Organizational Logical Number of Number of Units:
Forms Metric Forms Total Sample
D-T-R-A +3 (1) 167 (167)
D-T-A-R 5
D-R-T-A +2 (3) 53 (59)
T-D-R-A 1
D-R-A-T 27
D-A-T-R 2
T-R-D-A +1 (5) 4 (100)
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A 67
D-A-R-T 1
T-R-A-D 21
T-A-D-R 0 (6) - (39)
R-D-A-T 12
R-T-D-A 4
A-D-T-R 1
T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T 15
R-T-A-D -1 (5) 13 (31)
A-D-R-T 1
A-T-D-R 2
R-A-T-D 13
A-T-R-D -2 (3) 4 (22)
A-R-D-T 5
A-R-T-D -3 (1)__ 5 (5)
Totals (24) 423 (423)
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TABLE 4: Organizational Forms: Emergent Units
Social Order - Social Action Metric
Organizational Logical Number of Number of Units:
Forms Metric Forms Emergent
D-T-R-A 6 (+3) (1) 3 (3)
D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A
5 (+2) (3) 6 (6)
D-R-A-T 4
D-A-T-R -
T-R-D-A 4 ( + 1) (5) 1 (19)
T-D-A-R -
R-D-T-A 14
D-A-R-T -
T-R-A-D 3
T-A-D-R 3 (0) (6) - (11)
R-D-A-T 7
R-T-D-A 1
A-D-T-R -
T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
2 (-1) (5)
2
1 (3)
R-A-T-D 3
A-T-R-D 1 (-2) (3) 1 (7)
A-R-D-T 3
A-R-T-D 0 (-3) (1) 3 (3)
Totals (24) (32)
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The 24 organizational forms of association are arrayed on Tables 3 
and 4 with values ranging from 6 or +3 to 0 or -3. The key requirement 
for constructing the metric is to capture all of the differences between 
D-T-R-A or social order and A-R-T-D or social action. This can be done in 
the following way: At the social order end of the continuum, D precedes
T, R, and A (3); T precedes R and A (2); and R precedes A (1). Given 
one point for each conforming transitivity (3+2+1), D-T-R-A receives a 
score of six; while at the social action end of the continuum, A-R-T-D 
receives a score of zero. This scoring technique points to the importance 
of a processual view of organization in which transitivities reflect the 
sequential ordering of elements. Beginning at the social action end would 
simply reverse the scores, but not change the distribution in any way.
Thus D-R-T-A, for example, receives a score of five when starting from 
social order and one when starting from social action. With D-T-R-A, 
social ends predicate social means. With A-R-T-D, the obverse is the 
case. The 22 forms between D-T-R-A and A-R-T-D, and the remaining 1-3 
element forms subsumed by them, suggest varying degrees of continuity and 
discontinuity between the ends and means of collective life.
Notice again on Tables 3 and 4 that six of the twenty-four 
organizational forms fall at the midpoint of the metric. As illustrated 
in the third example above, these forms are neither order- nor 
action-driven. Their scores are the same regardless of whether the 
referent is social order or social action. A midpoint form such as the 
above T-R-A-D example receives a score of 3: from the social order end of
the continuum because T precedes R (1 point), T precedes A (1 point), and 
R precedes A (1 point); and from the social action end of the continuum 
because A precedes D (1 point), R precedes D (1 point), and T precedes D
13
(1 point). The score is 3 because no other transitivity is consistent 
with ’’perfect*' social order or "perfect" social action. By subtracting a 
constant 3 from each derived level of social order or social action, the 
resulting metrics are +3 to -3 with a 0 midpoint.
Going beyond Kreps' descriptions of the six midpoint forms, the
thesis addresses the problem of unraveling the tension or balance of 
action and order revealed by these forms. My approach is substantive and 
uses disaster research to exploit insights about structure from Weber and 
Durkheim. The central concept in the analysis is role. Before 
proceeding, however, let us consider current sociological approaches to 
action, order, and structure.
Substantive theories reveal a strain toward either social action or 
social order. Social action is grounded in the subjective states and 
behaviors of human beings. Social order is grounded in the collective 
representations and normative force of social units (Alexander, 1982a; 
Giddens, 1982). The resulting issue at the metatheoretical level has 
traditionally been one of trying to reconcile action and order 
perspectives. More specifically, under the continuing influence of the 
classics, some metatheorists (e.g., Parsons, 1938; 1950; Giddens, 1976;
1979; Alexander, 1982a; 1982b; 1983; 1984) make pointed attempts to
synthesize action and order perspectives. While abstract as opposed to
empirical, these attempts illuminate two important clues for substantive 
work. First, both action (and the actor) and order (and the unit) must be 
implicated in defining social structure as what is to be explained in 
sociology. Second, the conception of structure must be dialectical. From 
the action side, the knowledgeable and capable actor must be seen as 
subject of inquiry who creates structure. At the same time, the actor
14
must be seen as passive object of external units that are equally real. 
From the order side, structure must be viewed as fixed thing which 
maintains collective life. At the same time, it must be viewed as in a 
constant state of change as the result of the actions of human beings. To 
define structure only in terms of creating collective life is to be 
psychologically reductionist, while focusing only on how it is maintained 
results in sociological reductionism. Either path provides an incomplete 
definition and description of structure as basic subject matter.
Because metatheorists are oriented to defining the subject matter at 
an abstract level, they are less inclined to develop procedural rules for 
locating it. This indifference to substantive inquiry points to a 
critical distinction between thinking sociology and doing research. The 
former without the latter has resulted in a flawed exercise. Rather than 
exploit the dialectic to describe structure empirically, the effort has 
been to achieve a Hegelian synthesis. The attempted synthesis fails for 
two reasons. First, a dialectical definition of social structure is 
precluded. With the synthetic approach, you define action and derive 
order or vice versa. The result is the collapsing of definition and 
explanation of structure (Wallace, 1983). As Kreps points out, what is 
needed is a dialectical definition of structure that leads to description 
but not explanation. Second, the quest for synthesis denies the 
uniqueness of action and order perspectives as possible avenues of 
explaining social structure as it may be dialectically defined and 
described. Thus, substantive theorists are quite right when they choose 
action or order perspectives to explain social structure. But what they 
need, and do not have, is a dialectical description of what they are 
trying to explain.
15
The general requirement for those engaged in substantive research is 
to give more attention to defining and describing social structure as core 
subject matter of sociology. Heretofore, avoiding the trap of 
metatheoretical synthesis has been accidental rather than intentional.
The twin difficulty can be simply stated: there is an inadequate
definition of the subject matter at the metatheoretical level that is 
matched by an equally weak description of structure in substantive 
research. Perhaps this is why sociology is characterized more by 
dissensus than consensus with regard to paradigms, theories, and methods. 
The lack of consensus has fueled unproductive debates for too long.
Concerned with the current state of the discipline, I will focus 
initially on defining the puzzle— relying on the classical works of 
Durkheim and Weber to do so. Second, as outlined in the contemporary 
research of Kreps (1985), structure will be described dialectically within 
the context of disaster. Once again, the contributions of Durkheim and 
Weber are fundamental as I build on Kreps' earlier work. In the end, 
Kreps' and my studies of social response to disaster serve as the basis 
for a substantive comparison of Durkheim and Weber.
As outlined in the classical writings of Durkheim and Weber, 
attention to defining the subject matter is as important as attempting to 
explain it. In their classical works each implies that the subject matter 
of sociology— collective life— requires multidimensional expression, yet 
demands unidimensional explanation through substantive research 
(Alexander, 1982a). That is, they defined what is to be explained in 
terms of both the knowledgeable actor who creates and recreates structure 
(action), and the external unit through which structure is maintained 
(order), yet they tried to explain this common subject matter from
16
different perspectives. Weber focused on action, while Durkheim focused 
on order in the attempt to explain structure. Although both were 
self-defined substantive sociologists, each reacted metatheoretically in 
their observation of actors and social units. Their classical works 
illustrate the necessity of being unidimensional and multidimensional 
about structure. The result is an uncovering of structure as the 
dialectic of action and order.
A CLASSICAL APPROACH TO A CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM: 
DEFINING THE PUZZLE
In defining the discipline sociologists must come to a consensus as
to what it is we are trying to explain: Are we trying to determine how
collective life is created or how it is maintained? Is the actor the 
subject of inquiry or the object of inquiry? Is structure a unit or a 
process? Durkheim and Weber answer both to all of these questions. The 
actor is subject and object; structure is static and dynamic; and
sociologists can address action and order at the same time through
dialectical reasoning.
The above issues have become a major source of division among 
contemporary sociologists. The subject matter is defined in terms of 
either social action or social order— according to Alexander 
(1982a)— because of one-sided presuppositions about the nature of 
structure. At the ontological level the distinction is expressed by the 
debate between nominalism and realism (Warriner, 1956; Wallace, 1983).
At the epistemological level, however, the question is not what is real, 
rather it is how do we apprehend whatever '*it‘‘ is. How are the creation 
and maintenance of structure related? In what manner is the dialectic of 
action and order revealed by structure? The empirical requirements of 
science seem to demand that we choose either actor or unit as the object 
of inquiry. But how can we do that and still retain a dialectical (or in 
Alexander's terms multidimensional) perspective on structure? How, in the 
end, is it possible to capture substantively what are obvious 
contradictions?
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Weber and Durkheim introduced action and order, and their 
contradictory relationship in structure, as the unique domain of 
sociology. In comparing Durkheim and his order orientation with Weber and 
his emphasis on action, it is possible to begin to appreciate the 
magnitude of their sociological contributions and the importance of 
addressing the dialectic of structure from, respectively, order and action 
sides. First, a review of DurkheinTs order orientation will illustrate 
how, through substantive studies, he defined the puzzle of structure in 
terms of a paradoxical relationship between order and action, expressed as 
a problem of order. Weber recognized the same dialectic, but approached 
it from the action side. A closer look at his work reveals the care he 
took in attempting to capture the dialectic in his description of the unit 
of sociological analysis.
Durkheim: An Order Orientation
Throughout his work Durkheim points to contradictions. He explicitly 
defines the social order as more than a collectivity of individuals. For 
him there is a supra-individual reality that expresses order as the 
maintenance of collective life. DurkheinTs notion of social facts 
represents structure as objective, material as well as non-material, and 
external to the actor (Coenen, 1981). There is no doubt, however, that 
Durkheim struggles with the role of the individual when referring to the 
origins of these social facts. And, he never really resolves the dilemma 
that the decisions of individual actors somehow form the foundation of 
order.
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Structure itself is revealed in society's becoming and one can 
only illuminate it on condition of not losing sight of this 
process of becoming and changing. It (social structure) is 
constantly becoming and changing (forming and breaking down); 
it is life having crystallized to a degree; and to distinguish 
it from the life from which it derives or the life that 
determines it amounts to dissociating inseparable things. 
(Durkheim, 1900 in Wilson, 1981, p.1060)
The above quote seems to beg attention to origins of social facts. How do 
individuals contribute to the development of social facts and how are 
collective representations legitimated? At this level Durkheim recognizes 
the dialectic of social structure and expresses it as a problem of order. 
That is to say, social structure is external thing, constraining force, 
and constructed process all at the same time. While recognizing this 
paradox, Durkheim is not about to reduce sociology to psychology and 
therefore chooses sociological reductionism (DiTomaso, 1982). When the 
choice seems explicit in his work, Durkheim might be labeled 
unidimensional in his thinking (Alexander, 1982a). And yet Durkheim also 
reveals a pattern of flexibility in his studies that points to 
multidimensional reasoning about order, structure, and human action.
How is it that, at the same time as the individual becomes 
more autonomous, he depends more closely on society? How can he 
be at the same time more individuated [personnel] and more 
solidary? For it is indisputable that these two developments, 
contradictory though it may appear, occur in a parallel way 
(Durkheim cited in Giddens, 1977, p.274).
So Durkheim focuses on developed structures and assumes that they are 
somehow intimately related to the individual (e.g., Durkheim 1938, 1978). 
Interpreters of Durkheim who attend only to his inconsistent and
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contradictory analyses of the individual, ignore the centrality of an 
autonomous order in his work. The frequent contradictions in terms of 
theoretical strategies between the individualistic and social, and the 
normative and instrumental point to Durkheim's appreciation of the 
dialectic— not to a weakness in his work. He emphasizes order without 
denying action, and puzzles with an obvious paradox in their relationship.
In discussing the social order, Durkheim refers both to the fact of 
normative control and to the condition of stability (Alexander, 1982b). 
This exemplifies the inherent dialectic of order and is critical to 
understanding Durkheim's functionalist perspective. The tension or 
perhaps balance of Durkheim's vision is illustrated by his discussion on 
the variance of law and morality from one social type to the next, and the 
change within a particular type if conditions of life are modified 
(Durkheim, 1978).
Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that 
the first pattern is inflexible. The better a structure is 
articulated, the more it offers a healthy resistance to all 
modification; and this is equally true of functional, as of 
anatomical, organization. . . .  Nothing is good indefinitely 
and to an unlimited extent. The authority which the moral 
conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise no one would 
dare criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an 
immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must 
be able to express itself (p.17).
Durkheim"s awareness of the dialectic of structure is clearly evidenced in 
the above. His explanation of the normal and pathological is functional. 
Still, it is rooted in the contradictions inherent to the subject matter. 
He struggles with the role of the individual, but in the end addresses
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more pointedly the order perspective and how structure is maintained. 
Origins is given short shrift.
Weber: An Action Orientation
Like Durkheim, Weber sees the paradoxical character of the subject 
matter. For him the origins of social structure are far more important 
than its maintenance. This is evidenced by his attempts to capture 
rationality at the subjective level as logically prior condition of an 
external social order. However, it is important to recognize Weber's 
response to the dialectic of social structure as it is expressed from the 
action side. In his related discussions of the forms of rationality and 
types of social action (Kalberg, 1980; Levine, 19811, Weber shows a 
studied appreciation of the importance, independence, and constraining 
effects of an external order on the actor. This is exemplified in his 
discussion of the "rational conditioning" of scientific management.
The psycho-physical apparatus of man is completely adjusted to 
the demands of the outer world, the tools, the machines— in 
short, it is functionalized, and the individual is shorn of his 
natural rhythm as determined by his organism; in line with the 
demands of work procedure, he is attuned to a new rhythm through 
the functional specialization of muscles and through the 
creation of an optimal economy of physical effort. (Weber cited 
in Brubaker, 1984, pp.l4f).
Weber's notion of rational social action is especially critical for 
developing a dialectical conception of what is to be explained. In 
Economy and Society (19b8) Weber defines types of social action in terms 
of meaning frames of the actor. If concrete actors are the source of
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•‘'social order"'* for Weber (Alexander, 1983a); and if social 
relationships consist "entirely and exclusively in the existence of a 
probability that there will be a meaningful course of social action**
(Weber, 1968, p.26f.); then the actor must serve as both subject and
object of social structure, lest there be no social order at all. Stated
another way, the actor as either subject or object cannot be a
predetermined condition of social action if there is to be some logic to 
collective life. If such is true in the relationship between ego and 
alter, then the translation of individual ends as collective means is even 
more pronounced when action is aggregated into broader social units. 
Weber's pessimistic interpretation of bureaucracy is illustrative of this 
point.
Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those 
social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy 
is the means of carrying 'community action' over into rationally 
ordered 'societal action.' Therefore, as an instrument for 
'societalizing' relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is 
a power instrument of the first order— for the one who controls 
the bureaucratic apparatus (Weber, 1958b, p.228).
The conclusion here is that Weber has captured the dialectic of social 
structure but, in contrast to Durkheim, he expresses it from an action 
perspective.
Alexander (1983a) credits Weber with distinguishing between types of 
rationality and social action. However, he criticizes him for not 
adhering consistently to a multidimensional tradition in his sociology. 
Certainly Weber's analysis is, as Alexander suggests, **unfailingly 
ambivalent." But perhaps this is because Weber was far more intent on
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description than explanation. That is to say, he was not trying to 
describe action to explain order or vice versa. Rather he was trying to 
describe the dialectic of social structure that he observed in his 
historical comparative studies. As evidenced in the Protestant Ethic,
even as he focuses on social action, he does not deny the existence of an
equally viable social order in describing capitalism.
The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos 
into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to 
him . . .  as an unalterable order of things in which he must 
live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in 
the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic 
rules of action. The manufacturer who in the long run acts 
counter to these norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated 
from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not 
adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a 
job. (Weber, 1958a, pp.55f cited in Brubaker, 1984, p.23).
At this more substantive level, Weber examined social structure as a 
process wherein social action is made central.
In order to accomplish this Weber developed the methodological
strategy of ideal types. His historical and transhistorical ideal types 
are important for examining and rendering intelligible patterns of action 
(Turner, 1983). Historical ideal types (e.g., bureaucracy, capitalism) 
express the content of social happenings. Transhistorical ideal types 
(the four modes of action) establish the elements from which historical 
ideal types are composed. The purpose of ideal types is to facilitate 
interpretation of the subjective meaning of structure as it is produced 
and reproduced by the human actor. Weber's method also makes explicit the 
problem of linking epistemologically the observer with the observed— a
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concern not addressed by Durkheim and frequently overlooked today. The 
question is what are the rules that link ideal types, the observer who 
uses them, and the observed subject? Such rules remain to be developed 
(Giddens, 1976).
Weberns methodological strategy is extended by Kreps' (1985, ch.4) 
ongoing research. Kreps employs the ideal types methodology in observing 
what he terms forms of human association (Simmel, 1908). Kreps' 
historical ideal types— the 64 forms of association— link the observer to 
the content of social action. Content implies the historical events 
themselves and their culturally specific meanings. Form expresses the 
sequencing of these events and the timing of communications through which 
these specific meanings are collectively represented. As such, the 
communications are devoid of meaning, reflecting simply the organization 
of information (Mayhew, 1980; 1981). Kreps' continuum and metric link
these historical ideal types to two transhistorical ideal types: social
order and social action.
Transhistorical ideal types link the observer to what is not 
observed. For Weber the four modes of action were termed mental 
constructs. In neo-Kantian fashion, Kreps defines social order and social 
action as transcendental knowledge (i.e., real but not observable). The 
importance of transhistorical ideal types is their ‘‘objective" nature, one 
which is enhanced by intersubjective agreement. Content and form are 
therefore defined through subjective (Weber) as well as objective (Kant) 
lenses in Kreps' framework. His four core elements are put into precise 
relationships, in terms of identifiable rules of transformation.
In the end, Kreps' extension of Weber's methodology makes it possible
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to describe the contradictions of action and order in structure. 
Explanation is a completely different matter. At that level one can 
freely emphasize either individual or collective properties of structure. 
The admonition implied by Weber, and also Durkheim from the order side, is 
simply this: avoid collapsing description and explanation at the level of
defining what is to be explained. That is to say, one must not describe 
action to explain order or vice versa. To the contrary, one must describe 
a dialectical relationship between them. The result for Kreps is a 
taxonomy of forms that is neither psychologically nor sociologically 
reductionist (DiTomaso, 1982).
Weber's concern with describing structure as process culminated in 
the development of taxonomies— most notably his four forms of social 
action. Durkheim also recognized the power of taxonomies as descriptive 
devices, as evidenced by his work with forms of social order. In sum, 
Weber and Durkheim define a unique subject matter for sociology. In so 
doing they provide parallel conceptions of social structure that are 
equally dialectical. Finally, they point to the essential role of 
classification for describing social structure: Weber in his discussions
of ideal types; and Durkheim by his methodological rules for examining 
social facts. As further detailed below, Kreps highlights the symmetry of 
Weber and Durkheim with reference to the content and form of structure.
RESOLUTION OF A PARADIGM DILEMMA: 
WORKING AT THE MARGINS OF 
INTERPRETIVE AND POSITIVIST SOCIOLOGY
The concern with the dialectic of social structure is at the core of 
the contributions of Durkheim and Weber. By distinguishing between 
defining and explaining the subject matter of sociology, they provide a 
model for advancing knowledge of structure. Weber comes to the dialectic 
from the perspective of social action, thereby emphasizing the psychic 
states and behaviors of human beings. Durkheim comes to it from the 
perspective of social order, and focuses on the collective representations 
and normative force of social units. While each points to types of social 
structure, neither has an elaborate taxonomy. Their legacy will not be 
realized until this has been accomplished. The task will not be easy. To 
date, there is little consensus in sociology about the definition of 
structure, how it comes into being, how it is maintained, and how it ends.
At least some of the confusion stems from the fact that sociology has 
two competing paradigms and the proponents do not share a vision of what 
social structure is. As conceptualized by Kreps (1985, ch.3) sociology 
has three paradigms— what he terms interpretive, positivist, and 
structural sociologies. Interpretive sociology is attentive to action, 
positivist sociology to order, and structural sociology to both action and 
order. Interpretive and positivist sociologies are predominant, while 
structural sociology is implicit and marginal to the other two. Using 
Alexander's (1982a) terminology, every social scientist makes 
presuppositional decisions about human action and how it is collectively
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patterned. Unfortunately, these presuppositions are usually left 
implicit. It is both Alexander's and Kreps' intent to make them explicit, 
thereby revealing the paradigmatic character of sociology in more stark 
relief.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Kreps suggests that the presuppositional 
position of interpretive sociology makes action (and the actor) central. 
Order is benign abstraction that is produced and reproduced. Positivist 
sociology proclaims the preeminence of order (and the external unit). The 
actor is passive and action is patterned and conditional. Structural 
sociology acknowledges the autonomy and unity of action (and the actor) 
and order (and the unit). Because of this dialectical expression of 
structure, both action and order are necessarily implicated in the 
explinandum of structural sociology. That explinandum remains to be 
developed. When that time comes, and to the extent that a structural 
explicandum can be shared by interpretive and positivist sociologists, 
complementary explanations of social structure can be developed within the 
two dominant paradigms. It should be added that a dialectical conception 
of social structure precludes grand synthesis. The approach instead must 
be additive development of knowledge. In other words, actor and unit 
explanations of social structure will never be synthetic. Indeed, the 
quest for synthesis collapses description and explanation of collective 
life into a hopeless morass. But neither will these explanations be 
incompatible. Rather, they will be combinatorial explanations arrived at 
independently by positivist and interpretive sociologists.
The first and most critical step is defining the common subject 
matter. What is the generic meaning, the most encompassing definition of
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what is to be explained? Heretofore, little sustained effort has been 
made to answer this question. As indicated in Figure 1, to do so within 
structural sociology requires taxonomies which reveal the autonomy and 
unity of action and order. Only when the taxonomy problem has been solved 
can model building usefully derive from the two dominant paradigms. At 
that point actor based and unit based reductionism are equally viable.
Once defined and located, it is possible to examine the origins of 
any phenomenon that is of interest. The relevant question here is how is 
social structure created? On the other hand, it is equally feasible to 
examine the growth, development, and survival of any phenomenon. The 
relevant question here is how is social structure maintained. Both 
questions are logical and equally important. However, answers to them 
possibly yield different explanations of a common subject matter. Whether 
it is creation or maintenance, answers from interpretive sociology will 
point to the dynamism of the actor while answers from positivist sociology 
will point to the dynamism of the unit. Does one perspective more 
adequately explain structure? I think not.
The conclusion here is that action and order explanations of 
structure are equally viable and should be developed independently. With 
alternative explanations provided, perhaps it will be possible to unravel 
the dialectic of structure. Once again, the theorist must make a choice 
at the level of explanation. In giving primacy to either actor or unit, 
the theorist must also recognize that any model developed will be partial. 
Such is the path toward knowledge: a dialectical conception of social
structure shared by interpretive and positivist sociologists and
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reductionist explanatory models developed within the boundaries of the two 
respective paradigms. The additive results of such models will hopefully 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of structure.
By cross classifying order as unit and process with the actor as 
object and subject, Kreps develops the four-fold table illustrated on 
Figure 2. Notice that positivist, interpretive, and structural 
sociologies are all represented. The figure serves to distinguish between 
the domains of description and explanation. The first and fourth cells 
depict structural sociology and the dialectic of action and order as a 
problem of describing structure as the subject matter of sociology. In 
Kreps' theory example of structural sociology (discussed further below), 
such description is captured by a taxonomy of the forms of human 
association. The explanation of these forms commands attention to cells 2 
and 3 and the unique modes of positivist and interpretive sociologies. 
Positivist sociology points to the unit as given and provides order based 
explanations of these forms. Interpretive sociology points to the actor 
as given and provides action based explanations of these forms.
As further discussed in the next section, one of the few contemporary 
studies which intentionally works at the margins of interpretive and 
positivist paradigms is Kreps' research on disaster and social structure. 
As mentioned earlier, he relies equally on Durkheim and Weber. Using case 
studies Kreps bridges content and form; observer and observed; and 
qualitative and quantitative methods in describing forms of human 
association.
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A SUBSTANTIVE BASE: KREPS" TAXONOMY OF FORMS
Metatheoretically, Kreps expresses structure as a dialectical 
relationship between action and order. Substantively, he evidences 
structure as alternate forms of human association. Empirically capturing 
these forms is, first and foremost, a problem of taxonomy. The resulting 
theory of organization as unit and process is grounded in the disaster 
context. Employing a comparative case study approach, Kreps identifies 
423 instances of organization from 15 disaster events (earthquakes, 
hurricanes, floods, tornadoes). His qualitative analyses are of 
interviews and documents from the Disaster Research Center archives 
(University of Delaware) of studies of local community responses to 
selected natural disasters. Working with these data to reconstruct what 
happened, Kreps devises a strategy for distinguishing organization from 
other forms of human association. In that regard, he defines what are 
termed individually necessary and collectively sufficient elements of 
organization as form of association. Some 24 such forms are identified as 
matters of logic and evidence. Kreps therefore uses this definition to 
develop a structural taxonomy of, in the Weberian sense, historical ideal 
types. In his original spadework, Kreps did not know nor did he foresee 
the development of a quantitative metric which would substantively connect 
the 24 forms to two transhistorical ideal types. The two transhistorical 
ideal types reflect a continuum, with social order at one end and social 
action at the other. What amounts to a case of serendipity (Merton, 1957) 
reinforces the importance of a flexible qualitative methodology. Without 
fully anticipating the emergent quantitative significance of his studies,
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Kreps emphasized the development of taxonomy.
The actor is both subject and object, and order is both process and 
unit in Kreps" framework. While the model that he develops falls within 
positivist sociology, he encourages alternative models from interpretive 
sociology. In the latter mode more attention would be given to using 
individual perceptions, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors as explanans 
of the organizational forms that have been identified. Thus while the 
limitations of the archival data restricted Kreps" model to the positivist 
perspective, his taxonomy captures the dialectic of structure from either 
paradigm. The following brief discussion summarizes how this was done.
As noted in the introduction, in Kreps' theory existence of 
organization is defined as the presence of four individually necessary and 
collectively sufficient elements: domain (D), tasks (T), human and
material resources (R), and activities (A). Each element is analytically 
unique and no pattern of all four can be assumed a priori. Thus, their 
ordering indicates when each element appears as a part of the origins of 
organization in the disaster context. Such sequencing in time and space 
of the four core elements yields 24 logically possible forms of 
organization and, as part of a process 40 non-organizational forms of 
association. The resulting 64 element patterns express, as matters of 
content and form, a possible explicandum for structural sociology.
Drawing from DurkheinTs conception of social facts (Kreps, 1985, 
ch.4), two of the elements, domain (D) and tasks (T), are interpreted as 
collective representations of organized activities, as they might be tied 
to DurkheinTs sociological idealism. The remaining two elements, 
resources (R) and activities (A), reflect more directly the sociological
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materialism of Weber and to some extent Marx. Treated independently, 
Kreps (1985, ch.4) defines the elements as follows:
Domain (D)
Domains are bounded spheres of human activity which point 
to the existence of a unit and what it does. As things, domains 
are collectively represented in the communications of (1) those 
included in these spheres of activity and (2) those who interact 
with them at the boundaries of the unit (Levine and White, 1961; 
Thompson, 1967; Haas and Drabek, 1973). Domains translate 
actual or threatening physical and social impacts as units of 
social action. The many types of domains encompass the time 
periods before (e.g., warning), during (e.g., evacuation), and 
after (e.g., reconstruction) the event. A unit specification 
does not imply anything else about the existence (or 
achievement) of organization. As individually necessary 
condition of organization, then, domain points to a form of 
association that is distinct from all others. Its establishment 
may take place at any point in the origins of organization.
Tasks (T)
Tasks are specifications of a division of labor for the 
enactment of human activity. As things, tasks independently 
define the unit quality of social action. While domain 
represents social structure as open system that is legitimated 
internally and externally, tasks point to it as closed system 
that is structured from within (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1967). 
As part of a process, tasks are a unique expression of form.
They may come to exist at any point in the origins of 
organization.
Human and Material Resources (R)
Resources are the material technologies and subjective 
attributes of human populations. Their presence in a process as 
things comes to be defined with reference to the unit quality of 
social structure, but they may be mobilized prior to or 
following the emergence of domains and tasks. Resources are 
both static and dynamic: static because their relevance as a
part of organization is conditioned by the external reality of 
domains and tasks; dynamic because domains and tasks are, at 
the same time, social constructions of human beings.
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Activities (A)
Activities are the interdependent actions of human 
populations which at once establish and are conditioned by 
social structure. As things, activities are the remaining 
social means of organization which although analytically 
distinct, relate symmetrically with its interpretation as unit 
and process. Activities are no more or less analytically 
important than the remaining three elements. Certainly all of 
the four elements are grounded in the actor, as reality and as 
creator of the social order. However, the elements are equally 
represented by the social unit, as reality and normative force.
Thus just as organization is at once static and dynamic, so too 
are the activities of human beings (Warriner, 1956; 1970;
Giddens, 1979; Alexander, 1982a).
To repeat, in describing alternative forms of human association, each 
element is logically and empirically independent. Thus, no single pattern 
or order of the elements can be assumed. The resulting taxonomy includes 
64 forms of association (see Table 2, p.9), only 24 of which represent 
organization as Kreps defines the term from the perspective of structural 
sociology. The processual pattern of the elements implies the extent to 
which a given form of organization is order or action driven. Consistent 
with DurkheinTs notion of collective representations, order-driven 
patterns reveal the early emergence of domains and tasks. Ends predicate 
means, the unit appears as dynamic, and the actor is seen as passive 
object of structure. Related to Weber's types of social action, 
order-driven patterns reflect “instrumentally rational" action. External 
efficiency criteria are critical and "expectations as to the behavior of 
(actors) . . . are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment
of . rationally pursued and calculated ends" (Weber, 1968, p.24,
emphasis added).
On the other hand, the early emergence of activities and resources 
point to action-driven patterns. Attention shifts to Durkheim's notion of 
structure in a state of becoming or Weber's notion of substantive
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rationality. Here means predicate ends, the actor appears as dynamic 
subject rather than passive object, and the unit as conceptual abstraction 
(Giddens, 1979). As noted in the introduction, the midpoint of the metric 
Kreps has constructed highlights the tension or balance of the forces of 
social action and social order. There is tension because order implies a 
unit referent while action implies an actor referent. There is balance 
because the dialectic of structure captures both order and action. That 
is to say, the unit is both external thing and constructed object of 
action; and the actor is both prime mover and passive object of this 
thing. Such is the paradox that captured the respective imaginations of 
Durkheim and Weber. Such is the paradox that they observed in their 
respective studies. As long as it is recognized that both actor and 
structure are analytical rather than concrete entities, and that each is 
transitive as well as intransitive (Bhaskar, 1979), then there is no need 
for a so-called building block of structure. Freed of that ontological 
requirement, the dialectic of structure is completely symmetrical. Simply 
put, structure is unit and process; and actor is subject and object 
(Giddens, 1979; Alexander, 1982a; Kreps, 1985).
For purposes of the present research, the organizational elements 
capture the dialectic. As defined above, organization exists when all 
four elements (D, T, R. and A) are present. A processual 
conceptualization of organization captures the contradictory relationship 
of action and order as separate and integrated dimensions of human 
association. In other words, each element and combination of elements is 
at once a form in and of itself and part of another form as it develops. 
Each element is intransitive (exists as a fixed reality) and, at the same 
time, transitive (changing, becoming). So with the earlier T-R-A-D
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example of origins, T is in and of itself an important phenomenon. It is 
also relevant as the initial step in the organizing process. It is 
possible then, to look at the accumulation of elements as stages in the 
development or emergence of organization. Each stage in this development 
(e.g., T, TR, TRA, TRAD) can be seen as independently and sequentially 
significant. Each, therefore, is an important focus of analysis.
In the disaster context a processual perspective on organization 
reveals that people are making choices under conditions where normal 
routines have been disrupted (Kreps, 1985, ch.3). Their improvisations 
are empirically grounded by the historical circumstances in which they 
occur— circumstances which point to the dialectic of structure. 
Specifically, both role-making and role-playing (Turner, 1978) are being 
evidenced and the distinction between them implies Kreps' discussion of 
interpretive and positivist sociologies. In sociology role is generally 
defined as (1) social expectations of (2) behavior, both of which relate 
to (3) identifiable positions in (A) observable social units (Stryker, 
1980). The argument here is that to even speak of role is to beg a choice 
between interpretive and positivist sociologies in any effort to unravel 
the forms of association which Kreps has identified. That is to say, 
while the forms may be described dialectically, any effort to explain them 
must draw uniquely from the two dominant paradigms in the field. That is 
to say, the human being must be treated as either autonomous creator or 
constrained object of social structure; and the social unit must be 
treated as either real entity or constructed abstraction.
The above definition encompasses both stable and fluid forms of 
social organization. Turner's concern with role-taking illustrates the 
usefulness of role in distinguishing between action and order in the
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present research (Stryker, 1980). Structured social expectations shape 
the course of interaction when an actor puts himself in the place of 
another and adjusts his behavior accordingly. But if roles are not well 
defined, role-taking yields newly defined roles and expectations or what 
can be termed role-making. In the disaster setting there is often 
sufficient ambiguity in role-taking to allow for role-making. When the 
latter occurs the actor is, in effect, creating structure through 
decisions and behaviors. A resulting interpretation of the actor as 
dynamic subject of structure is central for explaining forms of 
association within interpretive sociology. By contrast, the concept of 
role-playing emphasizes action as patterned and conditional. The actor is 
deciding and behaving within socially defined expectations of what to do. 
Accordingly, the unit is thought of as apart from the actor when forms of 
association are explained within positivist sociology. Thus, the 
venerable concept of role provides one way of building from 
multidimensional description Jto unidimensional understandings of 
organizational forms. It is hoped that the attempt to make this 
transition will implicate the unique explanatory importance of the two 
dominant paradigms in sociology.
Specifically, using role-making and role-playing to distinguish 
between the creation and maintenance of structure, this thesis examines 
thirty-eight of the thirty-nine midpoint cases identified in Kreps' work. 
(Interviews and documents are not presently available for one case, a 
T-R-A-D form.) As noted earlier, these midpoint cases reflect the balance 
or tension between action and order. For purposes of this thesis these 
cases are ideal because circumstances aren't biased toward either action 
or order explanations. Rather, they provide a beautiful context for a
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consideration of role as it is employed uniquely within interpretive and 
positivist sociologies. Each enactment (1, 2, 3 and 4 elements present) 
will be analyzed as a four-stage organizing process. For each stage of 
origins, the relative importance of role-making and role-playing will be 
assessed independently as each contributes to understanding what is 
happening. That completed, role-making and role-playing will be examined 
further with reference to other characteristics of responses and disaster 
events.
ACTION, ORDER, AND STRUCTURE: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Kreps" taxonomy and metric present the dialectic of action and order 
as a problem of description. Albeit tentatively, I try to go beyond 
description in the current work via an assessment of role-playing versus 
role-making at the origins of organization. Using the same archival data 
and case study approach that Kreps used, the present study focuses on 
thirty-eight midpoint forms previously located by him. Because the six 
midpoint forms highlight equally the dyanamics of action and order, it was 
felt that both role-playing and role-making would be evidenced and, 
perhaps, at each stage of origins (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements present). By 
going beyond Kreps" methodological framework we can, in effect, address 
more pointedly the problems of explaining the contradictory subject matter 
defined in the classical works of both Weber and Durkheim.
The interviews and documents from the Disaster Research Center are 
the same data Kreps analyzed in his work (see Table 3). Of the 
thirty-nine empirically documented midpoint cases I have reexamined 
thirty-eight. The research strategy involved (1) describing what was 
happening at each stage of the origins of organization, (2) evaluating 
each stage as to whether it was dominated by either role-making or 
role-playing, (3) identifying problems at the origins of organization, and 
(4) examining other variables as possibly influencing the dynamics of 
role-making and role-playing.
First and foremost the methodology is the comparative case study.
Each instance of organization was previously described by Kreps. My 
judgments about form of origins replicate his earlier ones. The 
methodology employed by Kreps and myself prompts questions about
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TABLE 5: Samples of Events, Interviews,
and Organized Responses
Total Sample Midpoint Cases
Events Interviews Responses Interviews Responses
1. Alaska Earthquake 
1964
250 92 13 7
2. Hurricane Betsy 
(New Orleans), 1965
128 36 7 4
3. St. Paul, Minn. Floods 
1965
50 6 2 1
4. Minneapolis, Minn. 
Tornadoes, 1965
30 7
5. Central South Colorado 
Floods, 1965
58 33 3 3
6. Mankato, Minn. Flood, 
1965
22 4 3 1
7. Topeka, Kansas Tornado 
1966
143 64 12 6
8. Belmond, Iowa Tornado, 
1966
13 7 1 1
9. Jackson, Miss. Tornado 
1966
50 8 —
10. Fairbanks, Alaska Flood, 
1967
98 56 13 5
11. Oak Lawn Chicago, 111. 
Tornado, 1967
59 18 4 3
12. Jonesboro, Ark. Tornado, 
1968
35 22 5 1
13. Hurricane Camille (Gulf 
Coast), 1969
70 36 9 4
14. Minot, North Dakota Flood, 
1969
37 16 2 1
15. Fargo, North Dakota Flood, 19 18 1 1
1969
Totals 1062 423 75 38
1 earthquake - 250 interviews, 92 organized responses
2 hurricanes - 198 interviews, 72 organized responses
6 tornadoes - 330 interviews, 126 organized responses
6 floods - 284 interviews, 133 organized responses
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thresholds— when does an element begin or cease to exist with reference to 
a form of association? When is a stream of events collectively 
represented as a legitimate sphere of action? What constitutes 
interdependent or joint actions— in terms of number of actors involved and 
their relationships? While the identification of the elements is 
replicable, precise thresholds for their existence have not been developed 
by Kreps or me. Rather, we communicate qualitative sequences of events to 
communicate threshold judgments that are, in the Weberian sense, 
plausible.
Measurement of Role-Making and Role-Playing
Kreps' methodology makes no distinction between role-making and 
role-playing. Referring again to Figure 2, role-making points to the 
actor and Interpretive Sociology (cell 3). Role-playing points to the 
unit and Positivist Sociology (cell 2). While Kreps' earlier description 
of the forms highlights cells 1 and 4 (Structural Sociology), their 
explanation requires attention to Interpretive and Positivist sociologies. 
I do not seek synthetic explanations of these forms. Rather, I search for 
unique contributions from each of the two paradigms for understanding the 
process of organization. As noted in some detail earlier, I think this 
strategy is in keeping with Durkheim, Weber, and more contemporary 
discussions of role. Is, for instance, a key resource (R) socially 
recognized prior to the event or is it an improvisation specific to the 
emergency period? Are tasks (T) structured by pre-disaster roles, or do 
they emerge willy-nilly as needs dictate? Do activities (A) reflect 
expected behavior or are actors creating responses unassociated with 
pre-disaster experiences? Is domain declared and legitimated by those
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Actor
(Action)
FIGURE 2: Unidimensional and Dialectical
Perspectives on Action and Order
Structure 
(Order)
Process Unit
1 2
Structural Positivist
Sociology Sociology
3 4
Interpretive Structural
Sociology Sociology
Paradigms in Sociology
1. Actor as object - structure as process: 
Structural Sociology (dialectical)
2. Actor as object - structure as unit: 
Positivist Sociology (order biased)
3. Actor as subject - structure as process: 
Interpretive Sociology (action biased)
4. Actor as subject - structure as unit: 
Structural Sociology (dialectical)
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expected to do so, or do others not generally identified with a particular 
response collectively represent the ends? As described in the previous 
section, role-making and role-playing distinctions beg questions of 
whether structure is being created or maintained* For purposes of this 
thesis, such distinctions are relevant at each stage in the origins of 
organization. For instance, in the T-R-A-D form described earlier, the 
task structure was noted as the first element present at the origins of 
organization (T). The methodological problem is to determine whether its 
enactment evidences role-playing (and order), role-making (and action), or 
some combination of both. At each subsequent stage the same problem must 
be addressed for every new combination of elements (T-R, T-R-A, and 
T-R-A-D). At each stage, then, the effort is not to describe the form 
(Kreps' strategy) but to represent what is happening with reference to two 
unique expressions of role. Role-playing points to positivist sociology. 
Role-making points to interpretive sociology. The requirement is to use 
both paradigms, additively, in accounting for a process already described.
A set of criteria has been developed for purposes of making more 
explicit judgments about role-playing versus role-making at the four 
stages of origins. Developing insights from Turner's (1978) and Stryker's 
(1980) work on the role concept, the four criteria include: (1) role
boundary expansion versus unique roles; (2) continuity versus 
discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role relationships; (3) homogeneity 
versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants; and (4) consistency 
versus inconsistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role. As a group, 
the criteria shed light on whether, at a given stage of a particular case, 
role-making dominates, role-playing dominates, or both are necesssary to
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describe what is happening. Each criterion in the set is scored in the 
following way:
Role boundary expansion versus unique role performance: 
l=unique role performance, role-making dominates 
2=mix of unique role performance and role boundary expansion 
3=role boundary expansion, role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
Continuity versus discontinuity of pre- and post-impact 
role relationships:
l=discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role 
relationships, role-making dominates 
2=mix of discontinuity and continuity of pre- and post­
impact role relationships 
3=continuity of pre- and post-impact role 
relationships, role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
Homogeneity versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants 
l=roles homogeneous, role-making dominates 
2=roles heterogeneous with undefined task structure 
3=roles heterogeneous with defined task structure, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
Consistency versus inconsistency of pre- and post­
disaster status/role:
l=pre- and post-disaster status/role inconsistent, 
role-making dominates 
2=mix of inconsistent and consistent pre- and 
post-disaster status/role 
3=pre- and oost-disaster status/role consistent, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
With regard to the first criterion, role-making dominates where no 
collective representation of roles exists at a given stage. Role-playing 
dominates when such representation does exist. An example of the former 
would be spontaneous search and rescue by people who happen to be in or 
near an impacted area. An example of the latter would be search and 
rescue in this same impacted area by anyone having relevant training. 
Evidence of both unique roles and boundary expansion indicates that
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neither role-making nor role-playing dominates at this stage. The attempt 
with this and the remaining criteria is to make clean analytical 
distinctions of role dynamics. When the data do not allow that, the stage 
is coded uncertain for that criterion (N=16 across all criterion and 
stages).
With regard to the second criterion, when multiple roles of a 
post-impact response are not generally connected prior to the disaster, 
role relationships are not socially defined and must be created by the 
participants. In this circumstance role-making is being evidenced. On 
the other hand, role-playing dominates in instances where pre-impact 
relationships among roles are mirrored in role relationships of a disaster 
response. For example, inconsistency of role relationships is exemplified 
when, at an emergency first aid station volunteer station wagon owners 
provide ambulance service as directed by trained medical personnel. 
Experienced ambulance drivers providing the same service is indicative of 
consistent role relationships before and after impact. Neither 
role-making nor role-playing dominates when there is a mixture of 
consistency and inconsistency among pre- and post-impact role 
relationships. Once again, when there is insufficient evidence available 
to cleanly isolate role-making from role-playing, the cases are scored 
uncertain.
The third criterion points to whether or not the roles of a response 
are homogeneous, heterogeneous with a defined task structure, or 
heterogeneous with an undefined task structure. The first possibility 
suggests that roles are undifferentiated and still in the process of being 
defined. For instance, volunteers offer to provide sandwiches for 
victims. Each participant is involved in the entire process of preparing
47
the food, each develops his own technique for doing so, thus role-making 
dominates. With increased specialization and a defined task structure, 
roles are more likely to be established, and behavior dictated by socially 
controlled expectations. Thus, as a production line for preparing 
sandwiches is developed there is a shared understanding of appropriate 
role enactment at each step of the process. As others volunteer to assist 
there is continuity in role performance so role-playing dominates. When 
roles are heterogenous, but a task structure is not well defined, there is 
a mixture of role-making and role-playing. Such is the case when sandwich 
makers are developing a rudimentary production line. Finally, no 
conclusive judgment is possible where available data does not adequately 
describe the roles involved in the response. These cases are coded 
uncertain.
The fourth criterion focuses on status/role consistency versus 
inconsistency. Status is defined here in terms of socially recognized 
categories of actors (Stryker, 1980). As such, they serve as "predictors*' 
of behavior of those classified in a particular status, or position. 
Socially defined expectations shape the behavior of and towards 
positionally labeled individuals. These expectations are termed roles. 
This criterion addresses the level of consistency between position and 
role. Inconsistency requires greater attention to defining appropriate 
behavior (role-making dominates), while consistency suggests accepted and 
understood positions and behavior (role-playing dominates). A college 
student organizing faculty members in an evacuation effort is an example 
of the former. A faculty member organizing students is more consistent 
with expected status/role and therefore exemplifies the latter. A mixture 
of both necessitates some redefining of status/role but also suggests a
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degree of stability in them based on previously shared collective 
representations. In such cases neither role-making nor role-playing 
dominates. When archival data prohibit interpretation of pre- or 
post-impact status/role the case is coded as uncertain.
These four criteria provide a way of distinguishing between 
role-making and role-playing during the origins of organization. Each of 
the four stages of origins was scored for each of the criteria. As 
outlined above, a score of 1 for any particular criterion at a given stage 
indicates domination of role-making. A score of 3 suggests dominance of 
role-playing. A mix of role-making and role-playing is given a score of 2 
as the midpoint between the two extremes. When the data do not provide 
sufficient information to code a criterion as role-making, role-playing, 
or a combination of the two, it is scored 9 (uncertain). With 4 criteria 
at each of 4 stages of origins for 38 cases, a total of 608 judgments 
about role dynamics must be made. The aggregate percent of judgments 
coded uncertain was 2.6. This low percentage suggsts that the archives 
can yield clean demarcations of role dynamics. For purposes of 
statistical analysis, all criteria judged uncertain are recoded as the 
midpoint score (2). By then adding the scores across all four criteria, 
the scores range from 4 (1 point on each of the four criteria: 
role-making dominates) to 8 (2 points on each of the four criteria: mix
of role-making and role-playing) to 12 (3 points on each of the four 
criteria: role-playing dominates) for each stage of origins. For
purposes of subsequent statistical analyses, role-making versus 
role-playing will be treated in two ways: first as a continuous variable,
with higher scores referencing greater degrees of role-playing; and 
second, as a polytomous variable (role-making, mixed role-making and
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role-playing, and role-playing).
Because of the centrality of role-making versus role-playing to the 
statistical analyses reported in the findings section, marginal 
distributions will be reported there as the lead to the presentation of 
data. Discussion of the remaining variables examined in the study, and 
their marginal distributions, concludes the current section. These 
variables will later serve as independent variables in the examination of 
role-making and role-playing. The effort involves a search for laws of 
interaction that relate to the role concept rather than tests of specific 
hypotheses (Dubin, 1978).
Measurement of Remaining Variables
The remaining variables of the study are broken down into the 
following five sets: (a) contingencies related to the four elements of
organization; (b) structural characteristics of the enacting unit; (c) 
social network characteristics of the enacting unit; (d) spatial and 
temporal characteristics of the enacting unit; and (e) characteristics of 
the event and broader community.
a. Element Contingencies (DCON, TCON, RCON, ACON)
Element related contingencies or problems were recorded for each of 
the 38 instances of organization examined. For example, any questioning 
of the appropriateness of an enacting unit's involvement in the event was 
defined as a domain related contingency. Confusion or disagreement about 
how things were to be done was recorded as a task related problem. 
Depletion of resources related to the response (e.g., damaged equipment or 
losses of personnel) was defined as a resources related contingency. 
Finally, disruption of activities (e.g., blocked access, overloaded 
communications, secondary impacts) was considered an activities related
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problem. Initial coding for element related contingency(ies) was as 
follows: (absent=l, present=2, uncertain=9). The frequencies of
contingencies for the four elements were well distributed: domain related
(N=18); task related (N=18); resources related (N=13); and activities 
related (N=26). Because contingencies can arise at any time during the 
process of organization, attempts were then made to distinguish between 
those occurring at the origins of organization and those taking place 
later (maintenance). The data did not always provide sufficient 
information to pinpoint the precise timing of the contingency. The result 
is reflected in the following coding system: no contingency present=l;
contingency present, onset at maintenance or uncertain=2; contingency 
present, onset at origins=3. Thus, the higher the score the more likely 
the occurrence of a contingency at the origins of organization. Some 9 of 
18 domain related contingencies (DCON), 11 of 18 task related 
contingencies (TCON), 4 of 13 resource related contingencies, and 19 of 26 
activities related contingencies could be cleanly pinpointed at the 
origins of organization. The effort in all cases was to see if response 
related problems were implicated with the dynamics of role-making and 
role-playing.
b. Characteristics of the Enacting Unit
(ELSTAGE1, FOT, SIZ, PLANN, RTSTR, VLOSS, CDMGE)
A dummy variable (ELSTAGE1) was created to differentiate between 
organizations initiated by domain or tasks (N=21) and those whose first 
element was resources or activities (N=17). It was thought that when the 
first element reflected a collective representation of what was being done 
and how (domain and tasks), then role-playing would be more evident in the 
organizing process. It should be added that by the logic of Kreps'
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metric, either domains or tasks are represented by stage two of the six 
midpoint forms.
Three additional variables were designed to capture global 
characteristics of each enacting social unit (FOT, SIZ, PLANN). The first 
variable identifies the type of focal organization engaged in the response 
(FOT). Responses of emergency relevant public bureaucracies (N=15) and 
voluntary agencies (N=3) were dummied out. Examples include police and 
fire deparments, hospitals, Salvation Army, and Red Cross. It was thought 
that these types of units might exhibit greater evidence of role-playing 
at the origins of organization because their general involvement and many 
of their domains are collectively represented prior to disaster events.
Size (SIZ) was used as a general indicator of the structural 
complexity of the responding unit. Pre-disaster membership was measured 
for organizations established prior to impact (e.g., police department, 
Civil Defense). For organizations with no pre-impact existence (e.g., an 
emergent group of volunteers) size was recorded as the number of 
participants. Because of concern about measurement error with emergent 
units in particular, an ordinal scale was used to measure size: 1=9 or
fewer (N=6), 2=10-20 (N=ll), 3=21-50 (N=6), 4=over 50 (N=ll), 9=uncertain 
(N=4). Uncertain cases were recoded to fall at the midpoint of the 
distribution.
Third, a dummy variable (PLANN) was created for those units (by 
necessity established) which had written disaster plans or formal training 
(N=14). The formal preparedness did not have to be specifically tied to 
the event in question or even natural disasters. For example, if the 
Civil Defense had a formal strategy for responding to a nuclear attack but 
no natural disaster plans, it was still recorded as having formal disaster
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preparedness. It was felt that regardless of how vague preparedness was 
(and in most cases it appeared to be so), the exercise of doing it would 
result in increased evidence of role-playing.
The response task structure (RTSTR) of the enacting unit was also 
measured. It was felt that a more complex division of labor might be 
associated with role-making in the circumstance of disaster. Measurement 
involved a recording of tasks that were collectively represented by 
informant participants for each instance of organization. The resulting 
number of tasks provided a crude indicator of the complexity of the 
division of labor during the response. A case involving 4 or fewer tasks 
was coded simple (N=17) and one with more than 4 was coded complex (N=19). 
An example of a simple task structure would be compiling a list of 
casualties and injured for a public information domain. An example of a 
complex task structure would be establishing a shelter for food, beds, 
clothing, and medical attention as parts of a care of victims domain.
There were 2 cases where the complexity of the task structure could not be 
determined with the available data. These were recoded as simple for 
purposes of statistical analysis. As can be seen from the earlier case 
illustrations, more general yet unique tasks were the ones represented in 
the interviews. This is in keeping with Durkheim's notion of social facts 
as external (and therefore identifiable) collective representations of 
what is taking place.
The remaining two variables in this block point to participant 
interaction in the responding unit. Each reflects a factor used to 
sustain communication among participants. Participant empathy and concern 
with victims' emotional and material loss (VLOSS) was collectively 
represented in 23 of the 38 cases. Participant empathy and concern for
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overall community loss (CDMGE) was collectively represented in 24 of the 
38 cases. It was felt that such empathy and concern might also be 
reflected in role-making to meet the demands of the event.
c. Social Network Characteristics 
(PINT, INLINKS, ITLINKS)
Any instance of organization may be linked in various ways to a 
broader network of social units. Three possibilities were examined in 
this study. First, a determination was made (PINT) of whether the 
response was largely self contained at initiation (N=13) or linked at 
local, state, or national levels to a network of responding social units 
(N=25). The number of links (INLINKS) was also measured (0=none, N=13; 
1=1-3, N=18; 2=more than 3, N=6; 9=uncertain, N=l). The uncertain case 
was recoded to fall at the midpoint of the distribution. Finally, those 
cases where the social networks were emergent (i.e., not established prior 
to the event: N=17) were distinguished from all others as a dummy
variable (ITLINKS). It was felt that emergent, larger, and less 
self-contained responses might increase the possibility of role-making.
d. Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Enacting Unit 
LOC, INTIME
LOC was created to measure the physical location of the response 
relative to the geographic area of primary impact. Those responses taking 
place within the impacted area were coded 1 (N=22) and those outside were 
coded 0 (N=16). It was thought that the former would reflect the often 
rapid changes of demands during the emergency period by evidencing greater 
degrees of role-making.
INTIME is a temporal variable measuring the time of enactment of the 
first element of organization relative to impact. Using an ordinal scale,
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time of enactment ranged from more than 72 hours before impact to more 
than 72 hours following impact. Either before of after impact, the higher 
the score the greater the gap in hours between time of impact and 
establishment of the first element of organization. Those responses 
beginning within 1 or 2 hours of impact were coded 1 (N=12), those between 
3 and 24 hours were coded 2 (N=10), those between 25 and 72 were coded 3 
(N=ll), and those more than 72 hours were coded 4 (N=5). Disasters are 
nonroutine events. Thus, responses to them will necessarily be nonroutine 
to some extent, regardless of whether they are initiated prior to or 
following impact. It was thought that those responses beginning 
immediately pre- or post-impact (within 2 hours) would might reveal 
interesting role dynamics as a simple function of the constraints of time,
e. Characteristics of the Event and Broader Community 
(EVENTTP, EVENT-MS, DOM-TP, COMM, C-EXP)
The variables labeled EVENTTP, EVENT-MS, and DOM-TP measure 
characteristics of the events in which the responses took place. The 
first variable (EVENTTP) distinguishes the events in terms of their length 
of forewarning. A pattern of increasing time to get ready for impact 
reflects differences between earthquakes (N=7), tornadoes (N=ll), floods 
(N=12), and hurricanes (N=8). It was thought that with less time to 
mobilize in anticipation of an emergency there might be greater evidence 
of role-making to meet urgent and unanticipated demands.
Some five of the events Kreps studied were more massive in terms of 
their physical magnitude (deaths, injuries, damages) and/or geographic 
scope of impact. These events included the following: Alaskan
earthquake, Hurricane Betsy, Topeka tornado, Fairbanks flood, and 
Hurricane Camille. Instances associated with these events (N=26) were
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separated from the rest and a dummy variable (EVENT-MS) was used for 
purposes of statistical analysis. The suspicion here was that the greater 
social disruption associated with these events might increase role-making 
to meet the needs of the emergency.
The third variable points to the domains of action of the 38 cases. 
Kreps' earlier classification of disaster domains (1985, ch.4) was 
collapsed to isolate those which were immediate post-impact and therefore 
urgent; and for which an accountable unit was less likely to have been 
identified (collectively represented as such) prior to impact. These 
domains include search and rescue, post-impact evacuation, providing basic 
victim needs other than medical care, and damage assessment. A dummy 
variable was used (DOM-TP) to distinguish the above types of domains 
(N=31) from the others (N=7).
The final two variables point to community characteristics relevant 
to disaster response. First, a dummy variable (COMM) was created for 
responses from communities where the population base was above 50,000 and 
therefore metropolitan (N=24). Second, a four level ordinal scale of 
community disaster experience (C-EXP) in the previous 10 years was as 
follows: l=no disasters and few if any threats (N=6); 2=no disasters but
several threats (N=21); 3=one or more disasters (N=ll); and 4=one or 
more disasters and several threats (N=0). Community size is a global 
measure of the human and material resources of the impacted community. 
Disaster experience represents the historical heritage of the community as 
that relates generally to the circumstances of the event. Both measures 
point to advantages for dealing with the unusual circumstances of 
disaster. If so, they should be relevant to the dynamics of role.
The next section examines the results of statistical analyses in
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attempting to better understand the dynamics of role in disaster 
responses. Marginal distributions for the dependent variable are 
presented first. Then using correlation, regression, and discriminant 
analysis, possible relationships between role-making— role-playing and the 
above independent variables are explored.
FINDINGS
Role-making versus role-playing at the origins of organization serves 
as the dependent variable in the analyses to follow. Marginal 
distributions for the dependent variable are presented initially and 
discussed. This is followed by presentation of correlation and regression 
analyses, broken down by stage of origins. Although not presented, 
discriminant analysis has been used to replicate successfully the findings 
from ordinary least squares (OLS).
Marginal Distributions of Role-Making— Role-Playing
Role-making versus role-playing is considered in two related ways for 
purposes of statistical analysis. First, it is treated as an ordinal 
variable, with lower scores indicating greater degrees of role-making and 
higher scores referencing greater degrees of role-playing. Second, it is 
treated as a polytomous variable which subsumes three dimensions: 
role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and role-playing. While I 
anticipated similar findings across the two modes of measurement, I 
thought that the exploratory yield of substantively important 
relationships might be higher with multiple measures of role. Recalling 
the original criteria for scoring role-making and role-playing (p.45), 
Table 6 illustrates composite marginals, by element stage, for the 38 
cases examined in this research. (Marginals for the individual criteria 
at each stage of organization can be found in Appendix 1).
The treatment of the dependent variable as a continuum of role-making 
(scored 4) to role-playing (scored 12) indicates rather clearly an 
increasing movement towards role-playing as organization is enacted.
Notice the wide distribution of scores at the first stage of origins (one
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TABLE 6: Role-Making to Role-Playing
Distribution by Stage of Origins 
Total Sample
Role-Making and Element Stages
Role-Playing Scores
1 2  3 4
4 - 2 - -
5 5 - - -
6 2 - 1 -
4 - - -
8 4 2 2 1
9 2 5 6 -
10 5 8 10 3
11 4 9 9 12
12 12 12 10 22
Totals 38 38 38 38
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element present). In spite of the bias of the original Disaster Research 
Center studies— with attention focused on the responses of disaster 
relevant public bureaucracies and voluntary agencies (60.3 percent of 
Kreps' 423 cases and 47.4 percent of the present subsample)— 11 of the 38 
cases (28.9 percent) evidenced a strain toward role-making (scores of 5,
6, and 7 on the composite score) and 11 others (28.9 percent) evidenced a 
mix of role-making and role-playing (scores of 8, 9, and 10 on the 
composite score). It is very important to note that all role-playing at 
stage 1 of origins involves an extension of the response from pre-disaster 
routines. However, subsequent role-playing (stages 2, 3, and 4) may have 
little to do with pre-disaster routines for criteria 1 (role boundary 
expansion versus unique role performance) and 3 (homogeneity-heterogeneity 
of roles of key participants). Here it is possible for role-playing to be 
circumscribed by the response and the event. Keeping this in mind, notice 
the increase in role-playing as organization emerges. By the second stage 
(2 elements present) there are dramatically fewer cases in which 
role-making dominates (7.3 percent with a score of 4 on the composite).
Yet interestingly enough, it is at this second stage that what might be 
termed "perfect role-making" (a score of 4) is recorded. This is possible 
because each stage is examined independently, and scores judged relative 
to the number of elements present. For example, perhaps at stage 1 a 
defined task structure (T) sets off origins and is accompanied by greater 
evidence of role-playing. Then at stage 2 the mobilization of resources 
(T-R) calls for a restructuring of the division of labor, and role-making. 
Similarly, element related contingencies can arise at any time during the 
life of an organization. Such problems may render pre-disaster or
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response specific role expectations of little use for directing decisions 
and behaviors. It is therefore possible for role-playing to dominate 
early in the process, while role-making comes into play later on. Here 
the marked movement towards role-playing from the first to second stages, 
and at each subsequent stage of origins, evidences the increasing reality 
of organization as external and constraining force on the actions of 
participants. As evidenced by stage 1 in particular, however, this 
Durkheimian force is at the same time a Weberian social construction. 
Moreover, Table 6 indicates that many organizations evidence a mix of 
role-making and role-playing at both the second and third stages of 
origins. Thus even as collective representations of what is to be done 
become more clearly defined with reference to participant communications, 
circumstances continue to call for flexibility and improvisation. By the 
final stage of origins, when all of the four elements of organization are 
in place, role-playing has become predominant. Quite simply, one would 
fully expect that to be the case.
For purposes of correlation and regression analyses, R0LEM-P1,
R0LEM-P2, and R0LEM-P3 scores are recoded in various ways as tri- or 
bi-level measures. The effort in all cases is to create statistically 
manipulable marginal splits that, at the same time, maintain important 
substantive distinctions. At the first stage of organization, R0LEM-P1 
scores are initially collapsed into three ordinal categories and an
assumed continuum of role-making to role-playing. Scores below the
midpoint score 8 reflect a strain toward role-making and are recoded 1 
(N=ll); scores of 8, 9, and 10 point to mix role-making and role-playing 
and are recoded 2 (N=11); and scores of 11 and 12 represent a strain 
toward role-playing and are recoded 3 (N=16). This three level ordinal
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variable is augmented by a dummying out of role-making (R0LEM1, scores of 
1 on R0LEM-P1), mix role-making and role-playing (R0LEMIX1, scores of 2 on 
R0LEM-P1), and role-playing (R0LEP1, scores of 3 on R0LEM-P1). The same 
procedure is followed for R0LEM-P2 recoding: role-making=l (N=2); mixed
role-making and role-playing=2 (N=15); role-playing=3 (N=21). Once 
again, this ordinal measure is augmented by a dummying out of, in this 
case mixed role-making and role-playing (R0LEMIX2, scores of 2 on 
R0LEM-P2) and role-playing (R0LEP2, scores of 3 on R0LEM-P2). The 
marginal frequency is too small to dummy out role-making as a dependent 
variable. Because lust one score of 6 is below the midpoint for R0LEM-P3, 
a single dummy variable which separates role-playing (scores of 11 and 12, 
N=19) from everything else has been created for stage 3. Note that the 
marginal splits for R0LE4 point to the predominance of role-playing (34 
cases with scores of 11 and 12). Given the absence of variance in R0LE4, 
no statistical analysis of this final stage has been undertaken. 
Correlations and Regressions by Stages of Organization
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of an exploratory model of the 
dynamics of role-making and role-playing at the origins of organization. 
The four stages of origins are arrayed left to right with the acronyms 
relevant to each stage listed in the appropriate boxes. The several 
blocks of independent variables are also listed, by acronym, on the left 
hand side of the figure. The lines with arrows indicate that the flow of 
the model is left to right. So at the first stage of origins, R0LEM-P1, 
ROLE Ml, R0LEMIX1, and R0LEP1 serve as dependent variables with respect to 
the exogenous variables. Then moving to the next stage, these measures 
serve as potential independent variables. And so on. The dashed line 
between R0LEP3 and R0LE4 indicates that while this final stage is
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analytically important, it is not analyzed in the present study because 
R0LE4 lacks sufficient variance to allow for further statistical 
manipulation.
For each stage bivariate correlations are initially presented in 
order to highlight those which are statistically significant at the .10 
level or beyond. (Appendix 2 records correlations, means, and standard 
deviations for all dependent and independent variables.) Then multiple 
regression analyses are run to determine which of the isolated independent 
variables have the most powerful unique effects. Multiple stepwise 
techniques have been employed in that regard, using a .10 significance 
inclusion criterion for adding variables to equations. While this 
somewhat loose criterion increases the chance of Type I error, most of the 
identified coefficients are at the .05 level of significance or better. 
Although not reported here, all regression findings have been replicated 
by discriminant analysis. Successful replication with the latter 
technique increases confidence that, for dichotomous or polytomous 
dependent variables, unique effects identified by regression equations are 
genuine.
a. Stage 1 of Origins: One Element of Organization Present
Table 7 summarizes the significant correlations at the initial stage 
of the origins of organization. Recall that the disaster event is seen as 
a social catalyst. Thus even though most of the instances of organization 
in this subsample were enacted by established units (27 of 38), existence 
is not assumed for purposes of studying the process of organization. An 
element of organization exists only when it is documented as part of the 
disaster-relevant response. As Kreps points out (1985, ch.5), not only is 
emergent organization characteristic of disaster, but the actions of many
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TABLE 7: Correlation Analysis:
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at Stage 1 
Origins of Organization
Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables
ROLEM-PI SIG. 
(Continuum)
ROLEM1
(Role-
SIG.
Making)
ROLE MI XI SIG. 
(Mix)
R0LEP1 SIG. 
(Role-Playing)
EVENTTP .22 .089
ELSTAGE1 .65 .000 -.71 .000 .22 .088 .45 .003
TCON -.28 .042 .37 .011 -.23 .086
RTSTR -.28 .042 .29 .039 -.21 .099
PINT .35 .015 -.34 .019 .28 .042
ITLINKS -.40 .007 .36 .013 -.34 .019
INLINKS -.37 .010 .26 .059 -.39 .007
PLANN .27 .049 -.25 .068 .34 .017
C-EXP -.22 .088 -.25 .063
COMM .25 .064 -.23 .078
INTIME -.26 .059
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established units are often suspended during the emergency period. Thus, 
nothing can be assumed about the nature of roles when organization is
created, or at any subsequent stage in its life history.
Table 7 indicates that if the first element of organization 
established is D or T (the latter for all but one case in this subsample), 
on the whole there is a much greater degree of role-playing at the first 
stage of origins (ELSTAGE1: r=.65 with R0LEM-P1 or role-playing; r=-.71
with R0LEM1 or role-making; r=.22 with R0LEMIX1 or mixed role-making and 
role-playing; and r=.45 with R0LEP1 or role-playing). The findings 
suggest that the early presence of a collectively represented division of 
labor— or what might also be termed shared understandings of how a
response is to be enacted— provides a strong indication of the extent to
which pre-disaster routines do, in fact, guide behavior in the disaster 
setting. At the same time, the positive correlation of ELSTAGE1 with 
mixed role-making and role-playing (r=.22) suggests that social 
expectations and improvised action mutually sustain one another in ways 
that are difficult to unravel.
Additional evidence of role-playing is found where the enacting unit 
has earlier engaged in some form of disaster preparedness (PLANN: r=.27
with R0LEM-P1 and r=.34 with R0LEP1); when the response is largely 
self-contained as opposed to linked with a broader social network at 
origins (PINT: r=.35 with R0LEM-P1 and r=-.34 with R0LEM1, and r=.28 with
R0LEP1): and when the response is enacted in metropolitan as opposed to
nonmetropolitan communities (COMM: r=.25 with R0LEM-P1 and r=-.23 with
R0LEM1).
Disaster preparedness (PLANN) points to pre-defined role obligations
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which are called forth by the occurrence of the unlikely event. It 
appears that at this earliest stage of origins, then, the increased 
clarity of role demands engendered by preparedness decreases the 
opportunity for what might be a facilitating mix of role-playing and 
role-making (R0LEMIX1: r=-.25). But if Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps
(1972) are right, at some point in the process of organizing, preparedness 
should enhance flexibility for dealing with unanticipated circumstances. 
Participants in self-contained responses (PINT) have fewer opportunities 
to redefine the basis of appropriate behavior as a result of influences 
from the broader social environment. Thus, they are more likely to 
respond on the basis of established practices. Finally, the ratio of 
disaster impacts to remaining resources tends to be lower in larger 
communities (COMM). Thus, routines are less severely disrupted and 
responses are more likely to take place with reference to them.
The correlation findings also point clearly to the dynamics of 
role-making at stage 1 of origins. For example, there is an interesting 
relationship between the dynamics of role and the presence and timing of 
task related contingencies. As noted on Table 7, the greater the evidence 
of task contingencies at the origins of organization, the less the 
evidence of role-playing (TCON: r=-.28 with R0LEM-P1), the greater the
evidence of role-making (TCON: r=.37 with R0LEM1), and the less the
evidence of mixed role-making and role-playing (TCON: r=-.23 with
R0LEMIX1). These correlations point to elemental attempts to improvise a 
division of labor in the face of unusual demands and social disruptions.
A similar strain toward improvisation is evidenced when the task structure 
specific to the response is more complex (RTSTR: r=-.28 with R0LEM-P1,
r=.29 with R0LEM1, and r=-.21 with R0LEP1); where the social networks of
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the enacting unit are emergent rather than established prior to the event 
(ITLINKS: r=-.40 with R0LEM-P1, r=.36 with R0LEM1, and r=-.34 with
R0LEP1); and where the social networks of the enacting unit are larger 
(INLINKS: r=-.37 with R0LEM-P1, r=.26 with ROLEMl, and r=-.39 with
R0LEP1). All of these findings again point to the creation of social 
structure in response to (1) severe demands of a nonroutine event and 
(2) more complex circumstances of collective action.
The remaining three findings on Table 7 are perhaps more subtle but 
equally interesting. Note that there is less role-playing in communities 
with greater degrees of disaster experience (C-EXP: r=-.22 with R0LEM-P1
and r=-.25 with R0LEP1). Although not reported on Table 7, greater 
experience is also positively related with role-making (C-EXP: r=.14 with
R0LEM1). Moreover, communities with more experience tend to have more 
severe events, as measured by magnitude and scope of impact (C-EXP with 
EVENT-MS: r=.31). It appears that while disaster preparedness increases
clarity about what is to be done., disaster experience serves as a tacit 
cultural resource which enhances flexibility. There is no question that 
both clarity and flexibility are needed during disaster.
Note also that there is more role-making when the period of 
forewarning is longer (EVENTTP: r=.22 with R0LEM1). This suggests that,
with the luxury of time, there is greater opportunity for restructuring to 
meet unusual demands. Perhaps when time is scarce the threatened 
communities respond, at least initially, in terms of routine practices. 
This same pattern may account for the intriguing relationship between role 
and the remaining temporal variable, INTIME. Specifically, the greater 
the gap (in hours) between the establishment of the first element of 
organization and the time of impact of the disaster, the less the mix of
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role-making and role-playing (INTIME: r=-.26 with R0LEMIX1); and
although not reported on Table 7 (below the .10 inclusion criterion), 
INTIME is positively correlated with role-making (r=.19 with R0LEM1). I 
conclude that time serves as an opportunity structure for redefining 
appropriate behavior to deal with unusual and difficult circumstances.
There is no question that much has been made above about largely low 
to moderate bivariate correlations. I think this is justified within an 
exploratory attempt to unravel often subtle processes of organizing. To 
further reduce the data to a few key findings, multiple stepwise 
regressions have been computed for each of the four stages of origins. As 
noted above, discriminant analysis has also been completed and, in all 
cases, replicates regression findings. At this first stage of origins, 
then, R0LEM-P1, R0LEM1, R0LEMIX1, and R0LEP1 have been regressed 
separately with the set of exogenous variables listed on Table 7. Using a 
.10 inclusion criterion for adding variables to equations, ELSTAGE1 is the 
only variable which makes the equation for R0LEM-P1 (BETA=.65, R^=.42) 
and R0LEM1 (BETA=-.71, R^=.50). No variable is statistically 
significant at the .10 level for R0LEMIX1. The equation for R0LEP1 is 
reported on Table 8. There ELSTAGE1 is again the key variable (BETA=.40) 
with PLANN (BETA=.29) also showing a positive relationship with 
role-playing. A key implication can be strongly stated. Where the first 
element at origins is a collectively represented end of organization (T or 
D), there is a substantial degree of role-playing associated with its 
enactment. In such instances pre-disaster routines are, in effect, 
guiding disaster related actions. Formal disaster preparedness sometimes 
becomes a part of these routines. At least at this first stage of 
origins, one consequence is enhanced clarity about what is happening.
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TABLE 8: R e g r e s s i o n  Findings:
First Element Stage
R BREAKDOWN
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
Beta
ROLEPI
Sig.
ELSTAGE1
PLANN
.406
.287
.403
.294
.008
.056
CONSTANT
R
-.203
.279
ELSTAGE1
PLANN
.199
.081
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b. Stage 2 of Origins: Two Elements of Organization Present
As indicated on Table 9, stage 1 role measures Lecome independent 
variables with respect to all later stages of origins (2, 3, and 4 
elements enacted). The dependent variables at stage 2 are R0LEM-P2 
(continuum measure), R0LEMIX2 (mix role-making and role-playing dummied 
out), and R0LEP2 (role-playing dummied out). You will note that each of 
these dependent variables shows substantial associations with all stage 1 
role measures except R0LEMIX1 (mix role-making and role-playing). The 
latter variable does not make the .10 significance criterion and its 
bivariate correlations are therefore not included on Table 9. The 
findings involving R0LEM-P1 and R0LEP1 with R0LEM-P2 and R0LEP2 (R0LEM-P1: 
r=.72 with R0LEM-P2 and .71 with ROLEP2 and R0LEP1: r=.63 with R0LEM-P2
and .66 with R0LEP2) suggests that role-playing at stage 1 continues and, 
as noted in the marginals, expands at stage 2. While there is 
substantially less role-making by stage 2, the findings involving R0LEM1 
with R0LEM-P2 and ROLEP2 (R0LEM1: r=-.63 with R0LEM-P2 and -.59 with
R0LEP2) suggest also that role-making at stage 1 contributes to its 
counterpart at stage 2. Interestingly enough, while role-playing at stage 
1 is negatively related to mix role-making and role-playing at stage 2 
(ROLEM-P1: r=-.58 with R0LEMIX2, R0LEP1: r=-.58 with R0LEMIX2),
role-making shows a positive association (R0LEM1: r=.43 with R0LEMIX2).
Perhaps three processes are being revealed by these findings: (1) the
autonomy of order through role-playing, (2) the autonomy of action through 
role-making, and (3) the unity of both through mix role-making and 
role-playing. At stage 2 the forces of order appear to constrain the 
latter process while the forces of action seem to augment it.
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Independent
Variables
ELSTAGE1
R0LEM-P1
ROLEM1
ROLEP1
DCON
TCON
RTSTR
PINT
ITLINKS
VLOSS
TABLE 9: Correlation Analysis: 
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at 
Origins of Organization
R0LEM-P2 SIG.
(Continuum)
.40 .006
.72 .000
-.63 .000
.63 .000
-.28 .045
-.22 .091
.23 .080
-.49 .001
-.32 .027
Dependent Variables
R0LEMIX2 SIG. 
(Mix)
-.25 .067
-.58 .000
.43 .003
-.58 .000
-.30 .032
.27 .051
.36 .014
Stage 2
ROLEP2 SIG.
(Role-Playing)
.36 .013
.71 .000
-.59 .000
.66 .000
.26 .056
-.24 .070
-.26 .054
-.47 .002
-.29 .037
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Notice that ELSTAGE1 (presence of T or D as first element established 
at origins) continues to show positive but less powerful correlations with 
role-playing (ELSTAGE1: r = .40 with R0LEM-P2 and r=.36 with R0LEP2).
Thus, the impact of predisaster routines remain important but attenuates 
as the organizing process unfolds. It could be these routines become less 
relevant as the unique demands of the situation call for new forms of 
social action. The now negative correlation with mix role-making and 
role-playing (ELSTAGE1: r=-.25), however, implies a tension between such
attempts to innovate and routine practices. While the presence of formal 
disaster preparedness (PLANN) and occurrence of the response in a 
metropolitan community no longer show positive correlations with 
role-playing, this pattern continues for responses that are largely 
self-contained at origins (PINT: r=.23 with R0LEM-P2). My interpretation
of the latter finding remains unchanged. That is, participants in 
self-contained responses have fewer opportunities to redefine appropriate 
behavior as a result of influences from the broader social environment. 
This enhances predictability but perhaps at a cost in flexibility.
There is substantial consistency of role-making findings from stage 1 
to stage 2. Specifically, task contingencies at origins continue to be 
inversely related with role-playing at stage 2 (TCON: r=-.28 with
R0LEM-P2 and r=-.24 with R0LEP2). Moreover, the same inverse relationship 
continues to hold for more complex task structures (RTSTR, r=-.22 with 
R0LEM-P2 and r=-.26 with R0LEP2) and when the social network of the 
response is emergent rather than established prior to the event (ITLINKS: 
r=-.49 with R0LEM-P2 and r=-.47 with R0LEP2). While the number of links 
(INLINKS) is no longer related to role measures, the direction of its
73
relationships are consistent with stage 1 findings (e.g. r=-.16 with
R0LEM-P2). Once again, these findings point to elemental attempts to 
improvise a division of labor under complex and demanding circumstances.
Of considerable interest as well, responses with more complex task 
structures and emergent social networks now show positive relationships 
with mix role-making and role-playing (RTSTR: r=.27 with R0LEMIX2 and
ITLINKS: r=.36 with R0LEMIX2). These combined findings imply the
beginnings of a more facilitating mix of the old and the new as the 
response unfolds. What Kreps earlier referred to, from Weber, as the 
useful blending of administrative and substantive rationality seems to be 
operating at stage 2 of origins.
Finally, two new variables come into play at stage 2: VLOSS or
evidence of empathy toward victims in the communications of direct 
participants and DCON or the presence of a domain contingency at origins. 
The former is inversely related with role-playing (VLOSS: r=-.32 with
R0LEM-P2 r=-.29 with R0LEP2). The latter is inversely related with a mix 
of role-making and role-playing (DCON: r=-.30 with R0LEMIX2) and
positively related with role-playing (DCON: r=.26). The measure of
empathy (VLOSS) recalls Durkheim's discussion of the moral order. The 
disaster disrupts the rational (instrumental) character of social routines 
(organic solidarity) and reveals their elemental grounding in the 
nonrational (normative) social bond (mechanical solidarity). The results 
are innovative attempts at organized altruism that is consistent with, in 
the Weberian sense, ultimate values. The presence of domain contingencies 
at origins (DCON) sugggests that internal or external expectations of 
appropriate spheres of action are being questioned by direct participants 
or those outside the response. In either case, it is likely that internal
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and external expectations of what is to be done do not parallel one 
another. With respect to the enacting unit, what may be in evidence here 
is the tension between organization as closed versus open system. The 
inverse correlation between DCON and mix role-making and role-playing 
implies, perhaps, that by stage 2 the enacting unit is accommodating this 
tension on its own terms.
Just as with stage 1, stepwise regression equations were computed to 
isolate the most powerful independent variables. Separate equations were 
run for R0LEM-P1, R0LEM1, and R0LEP1 because of the substantial 
multicollinearity among them. And to repeat, regressions were not run 
with R0LEMIX1 as an independent variable because it dropped out at the 
bivariate level. Tables 10, 11, and 12 show a consistent pattern of 
unique effects for the separate measures of role (R0LEM-P1, ROLEMl, 
R0LEP1), emergent social networks (ITLINKS), empathy for victims (VLOSS), 
and task (TCON) or domain (DCON) contingencies at origins. As highlighted 
in the discussion of bivariate correlations, role-playing and role-making 
dynamics show considerable continuity from stage 1 to stage 2; emergent 
networks, task contingencies at origins, and empathy for victims are 
implicated by the dynamics of role-making; and domain contingencies at 
origins (albeit less specifically than the correlations) suggest a closed 
system strain operating with respect to the enacting unit,
c. Stage 3 of Origins: Three Elements of Organization Present
As noted in the discussion of the marginals, role-playing 
predominates by stage 3 of origins. To repeat, however, such role-playing 
is specific to the response and not necessarily tied to pre-disaster 
routines (in the case of role criteria 1 and 3). Because of the 
predominance of role-playing, only it (R0LEP3) is dummied out against
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TABLE 10: Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage
Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables R0LEM-P2 ROLEMIX2 R0LEP2
Beta b Sig. Beta lb Sig. Beta b Sig.
ROLEM-P1 .593 .425 .000 -.550 -.323 .000 .604 .361 .000
VLOSS .220 -.269 .050 -.198 -.201 .083
ITLINKS .236 -.283 .051 -.213 -.213 .084
DCON -.232 -.137 .091
CONSTANT 1.884 1.317 .001
R2 .610 .389 .589
I2 BREAKDOWN
ROLEM-P1 .513 .337 .510
VLOSS .050 .041
ITLINKS .047 .038
DCON .053
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TABLE 11: Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage
Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables ROLEM-P2 R0LEMIX2 R0LEP2
Beta _b Sig. Beta b Sig. Beta b
ROLEMl -.493 -.647 .001 .402 .433 .010 -.488 -.535
ITLINKS -.295 -.353 .026 -.293 -.293
VLOSS -.215 -.262 .082
DCON -.253 -.150 .095
CONSTANT 3.004 .526 .838
R2 .524 .252 .426
I2 BREAKDOWN
ROLEM1 .400 .189 .351
ITLINKS .078 .075
VLOSS .045
Sig.
.001
.040
DCON .063
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TABLE 12: Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage
Independent
Variables ROLEM-P2
Beta b Sig.
ROLEP1 .483 .583 .000
ITLINKS .278 -.333 .027
VLOSS .278 -.340 .020
TCON .206 -.141 .081
DCON
CONSTANT 2.857
R2 .584
R2 BREAKDOWN
ROLEP1 .392
ITLINKS .086
VLOSS .065
TCON .041
DCON
Dependent Variables
R0LEMIX2 ROLEP2
Beta b Sig. Beta b
-.554 -.548 .000 .554 .558
-.262 -.262 
-.232 -.236
-.246 -.146 .071
.875
.396
.336
.578
.556
.436
.068
.053
.060
Sig.
.000
.038
.051
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everything else (mostly mix role-making and role-playing) to serve as the 
single measure of role at stage 3 (R0LEP3). As in stage 2, role measures 
at the immediately preceding stage (R0LEM-P2, R0LEMIX2, and R0LEP2) now 
become independent variables. While this simplifies the presentation of 
findings, it should be noted that role measures at stage 1 and stage 2 
show largely consistent patterns with R0LEP3 (see Appendix 2).
As indicated in Table 13, the continuity of role-playing from stage 1 
to 2 continues, albeit less powerfully from stage 2 to 3 (R0LEM-P2: r=.49
with R0LEP3 and R0LEP2: r=.48 with R0LEP3). The inverse relationship
between mix role-making and role-playing at stage 2 and role-playing at 
stage 3 (R0LEMIX2: r=-.38) points again to autonomous action and the
continuing need for innovative behavior in the circumstance of disaster. 
Certainly role-making is no longer independent of role-playing. But 
perhaps there remains a necessary coexistence of clarity on the one hand 
and improvisation on the other. ELSTAGE1 is again positively correlated 
with role-playing (r=.26), but note that the relationship has become 
increasingly less pronounced with each additional element. The finding 
lends further support for the conclusion drawn at stage 2: namely that
predisaster routines become enmeshed with new forms of social action as 
the impacted community responds to the unique demands of the emergency.
Several variables, some of which earlier suggested the dynamics of 
role-making, point to the same at stage 3. Task contingencies at origins 
(TCON: r=-.27 with R0LEP3), activities contingencies at origins (ACON:
r=-.33), more forewarning (EVENTTP: r=-.23 with R0LEP3), and greater time
between impact and establisment of the first element (INTIME: r=-.38) are
inversely related with role-playing. These findings suggest that there is
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TABLE 13: Correlation Analysis: 
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at Stage 3 
Origins of Organization
Independent
Variables
EVENTTP
ELSTAGE1
ROLEM-P2
R0LEMIX2
ROLEP2
TCON
AC ON
PLANN
SIZ
COMM
INTIME
Dependent Variable
ROLEM-P3 SIG.
(Continuum)
-.23 .080
.26 .054
.49 .001
-.38 .010
.48 .001
-.27 .049
-.33 .022
-.22 .094
.39 .007
.22 .094
-.38 .009
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a continuing need to improvise a division of labor as organization is 
enacted (TCON and ACON). Time (EVENTTP and INTIME) should be seen as a 
scarce resource for so doing. Notice also the negative correlation 
between formal preparedness and role-playing (PLANN: r=-.22). Recall
that at stage 1 preparedness had been positively related with 
role-playing. Now the relationship has been reversed. This finding 
supports the idea that preparedness has dual value. First, it increases 
clarity about what to do early in the response. Second, it is a resource 
for flexibility and improvisation as the response unfolds. Although not 
grounded in the nomenclature of role, this is precisely the argument made 
in an earlier planning monograph by Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps (1972). 
In Weberian terras, the planning effort may support the requirements of 
both administrative and substantive rationality.
The two remaining variables— responses enacted in metropolitan 
communities (COMM) and size of the enacting unit (SIZ) show positive 
relationships with role-playing (COMM: r=.22 with R0LEP3 and SIZ: r=.39
with R0LEP3). Recall that COMM showed a similar pattern at stage 1. My 
interpretation there was that disasters are less disruptive of ongoing 
routines in metropolitan communities (lower impact ratios) and, therefore, 
responses were more likely to take place with reference to these routines. 
My interpretation remains unchanged for stage 3. The more focused size 
variable (SIZ) suggests that the greater the number of participants, the 
greater the need for predictability about what they are doing as the 
enactment of organization comes closer to fruition. Such is the dictate 
of Weber"s notion of formal rationality.
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Tables 14, 15, and 16 summarize stepwise multiple regression 
equations, with R0LEM-P2, R0LEMIX2, and R0LEP2 run in separate equations 
to reduce problems of multicolinearity. The various role measures along 
with SIZ, INTIME, and PLANN fall out in quite consistent fashion as 
important variables in the equations. While role measures remain 
powerful— and indeed they should— notice the increased relative power of 
remaining variables as organization comes closer to enactment. This 
suggests that any analysis of role dynamics of organization must reference 
other variables of the enacting unit as well as broader physical, 
temporal, and social variables of the disaster setting.
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TABLE 14: Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage
Dependent Variables
Sig.
.000
.007
.001
.062
.083
R2 BREAKDOWN
ROLEM-P2 .236
SIZ .172
INTIME .122
PLANN .100
ACON .034
Independent Variables
ROLEM-P2 
SIZ
INTIME
PLANN
ACON
CONSTANT
R
Beta
ROLEM-P3
.548
.316
.398
.228
.220
.460
.148
-.192
-.236
-.124
1.992
.664
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TABLE 15: Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables 
R0LEM-P3
Beta Sig.
SIZ
R0LEMIX2
INTIME
PLANN
.389
.428
.390
.248
.182
.438
.188
.257
.003
.001
.003
.049
CONSTANT
R
2.976
.517
BREAKDOWN
SIZ
ROLEMIX2
INTIME
PLANN
.156
.163
.137
.061
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TABLE 16: Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
Beta
ROLEM-P3
Sig.
ROLEP2
SIZ
INTIME
PLANN
.540
.389
.382
.298
.543
.182
.184
.308
.000
.001
.001
.010
CONSTANT
R
2.563
.621
R BREAKDOWN 
ROLEP2 
SIZ
INTIME
PLANN
,227
,179
129
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CONCLUSION
Kreps" substantive theory of organization provides a useful basis for 
comparing Durkheim and Weber with reference to action, order and the 
concept of role. In the taxonomy of forms of association Kreps (1985) 
captures the paradox of structure from either order or action sides. When 
order is referenced, the paradox is nicely expressed by Durkheim. When 
action is referenced, the paradox is revealed most pointedly by Weber. In 
either case, I suggest that Kreps" notion of organization as process 
implicates still another venerable concept of sociology— that of role— in 
a very direct way. Specifically, the dynamics of role-playing and 
role-making distinguish between structure as Durkheimian force and 
Weberian social construction.
I argue that the tension or balancing of the forces of action and 
order can be uncovered through an analysis of role for the six midpoint 
forms in Kreps" action-order metric. Four criteria are used to 
distinguish between role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and 
role-playing at the four stages of origins (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements 
present) of these midpoint forms. Marginal distributions of role 
variables point to an increase in role-playing as each additional element 
of organization is enacted. However, the progressive character of 
role-playing is grounded, in no small way, by emergent improvisations.
Such improvisations are the stuff of role-making.
Role is analyzed, first, on its own terms and, second, as it relates 
to physical, social, and temporal characteristics of the response and 
emergency. Whether it be domain, task, and activities contingencies at
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origins of organization, the timing of origins relative to impact, 
participant empathy for victims, the size and preparedness of the enacting 
unit, the complexity of the unit's social network or the material and 
cultural resources of the impacted community, the correlation and 
regression analyses show that role must be unraveled as but one part of a 
broader structural drama. I conclude that the structural drama of 
disaster informs even as it is anticipated by the respective theories of 
Durkheim and Weber.
The statistical analyses summarily show both the uniqueness of 
role-playing and role-making and how they mutually reinforce one another 
as organization unfolds. When the first element of organization is 
enacted, their uniqueness is perhaps most sharply demarcated. The unusual 
and severe circumstances of a disaster disrupts social routines and 
requires new definitions of appropriate behavior. Such attempts to 
improvise are associated with task contingencies, a more complex division 
of labor, greater disaster experience in the impacted community, larger or 
emergent social networks, and greater length of forewarning. However, 
such improvisations do not preclude early reliance of community routines. 
Even as structure is being created to meet the unique demands of disaster, 
much role-playing is being evidenced as external force which molds the 
actions of participants. This is especially apparent when the first 
element of organization is domain or tasks, when the response is 
self-contained rather than boundary spanning, when there has been formal 
disaster preparedness, and when the broader community has ample resources 
with which to respond.
Role-playing expectedly increases just as role-making continues with
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the unfolding of organization at stages 2, 3, and 4. The viable mixing of 
Weberian social construction and Durkheimian normative force is, 
therefore, part and parcel to the creation of organization in the disaster
setting. Stated another way, the paradox of action and order is revealed
by the unity of action and order as organization. Most of the key 
independent variables at stage 1 continue to operate at subsequent stages 
and new variables come into play. Most notable of the latter are empathy 
for victims and the timing of the response as each relates to role-making;
and the size of the enacting unit as it relates to role-playing.
The dynamics of action, order, and role have thus far been considered 
only as a matter of theory. I also think the findings have important 
implications for disaster preparedness. Each the 38 cases examined in the 
study was successful in the sense that, in the face of unusual demands, 
organization was achieved. In recognition of that, Kreps (1985, ch.6) 
earlier offered several principles of emergency management based on 
findings from the total sample of 423 cases and an earlier monograph on 
disaster planning by Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps (1972). The results of 
the present role analysis supports and extends much of Kreps' reasoning. 
Blending further theoretical efforts in this thesis with practical 
problems of responding to disaster, my final remarks extend Kreps' 
discussion of management principles.
As reported in Kreps (1985), Table 17 juxtaposes popular images of 
disaster with more realistic implications derived from historical 
research. In what follows I will first relate the present findings to the 
principles listed on the right hand column of Table 17. Then I will 
discuss several of the remaining principles that Kreps develops from his
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TABLE 17: Popular Image Versus More
Realistic Implications for Planning
Popular Image
1. People when faced with a great 
danger will panic. Accordingly, 
warnings should be withheld 
until the last minute.
Realistic Implication
1. Information about dangers
should be disseminated and not 
withheld because of a fear that 
people will panic.
2. Those who do not act irra­
tionally are often unmobilized 
by major emergencies. They will 
need help to perform basic 
social functions.
2. It should be assumed that persons 
in disaster-impacted areas 
actively respond to the emergency 
and will not wait for communtiy 
officials to tell them what to do.
4.
Partly because of widespread 
individual pathological reactions 
and partly because of the over­
whelming damage to the resources 
of disaster-affected communities, 
the ability of local social units 
to perform effectively m  handling 
emergency tasks is severely limited. 
Outside help will be essential.
The social disorganziation of the 
communtiy, which is a product of 
disaster impact, provides the 
conditions tor the surfacing of 
anti-social behavior. Since social 
control is weak or absent, deviant 
behavior emerges and the dazed 
victims m  the disaster area become 
easy victims for looting and other 
forms of criminal activity.
3. The ratio of disaster damages to 
remaining community and regional 
resources most often is low to 
modest. Local social units 
generally have enough people and 
are not rendered ineffective by 
loss of personnel. Outside aid 
should be consistent with
local requirements and not sent 
indiscriminantly•
4. While symbolic security 
measures have to be taken, 
massive deployment of security 
forces is unnecessary. Looting 
and other anti-social behaviors 
are rare in disaster situations.
Community morale is very low in 
disaster stricken areas. Steps 
must be taken to overcome demoral­
ization of the impacted population.
Community morale is generally 
high immediately after a disaster. 
Quick restoration of essential 
community services will tend 
to sustain it.
6. A descent into total personal 
and social chaos is possible in 
communities impacted by major 
disasters. Immediate, firm, and 
unequivocal leadership is 
required. Often this leadership 
must come from the outside.
6. Communities mobilize rapidly to 
meet disaster demands even under 
circumstances that are quite 
severe. Timely coordination 
is more important than leadership. 
While often difficult to 
achieve, coordination is essential 
and should be maintained under 
local control.
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own study and show how they can be enhanced by use of the role concept.
With respect to statement 1 on Table 17, panic is not the problem. 
Instead, the need is to increase the possibility of informed evacuation 
decisions. The argument made is that information about threats should be 
issued early, general warnings relayed in terms of personal probabilities, 
and specific suggestions offered about what to do. Of course time is 
always of the essence, but findings from the present research support the 
argument for early dissemination of warnings. Recall that restructuring 
to meet unique demands is enhanced with greater length of forewarning. In 
the case of warning and evacuation, given timely information people will 
adapt routines to meet the requirements of the impending threat.
The second statement on Table 17 is supported by findings for 
role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and role-playing. The 
general thrust of organizing to meet disaster demands is the meshing of 
established and emergent structure. Thus, existent practices are not torn 
asunder and victims rendered helpless by the event. Even with more severe 
disasters there is considerable continuity between pre-disaster routines 
and post-disaster actions. People are guided by extant role obligations 
and, at the same time, highly adaptive to altered circumstances. The 
dynamics of role is evidence of both. Interestingly, the findings about 
domain contingencies suggests that there may be disagreements between 
community officials and direct participants about appropriate action. As 
Kreps suggests, the process may not always be rigidly controlled, but 
things get done.
The emphasis with the third statement is the importance of the 
relationship between disaster impacts and remaining local resources.
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Often there is considerable wherewithal with which to respond. The 
positive relationship between role-playing and community size is apropos 
of this point. Thus, the resources of, in particular, larger metropolitan 
areas should be borne in mind in considering the kinds and timing of 
outside assistance.
With respect to statement 4, the importance of pre-disaster routines 
and the considerable role-playing which takes place point to the 
continuing importance of social control when disaster strikes. And while 
the present research does not examine criminality in any way, it does show 
that empathy for victims contributes to organized altruism. In sum, there 
is little evidence of disorganization and normative breakdown, 
considerable evidence of prosocial action, and as suggested by statement 
5, community morale remains high. There are, of course, limits to the 
adaptiveness of any social system. While little is known about them, it 
is clear that most disasters do not overwhelm the capacities of impacted 
communities.
As indicated by statement 6, communities mobilize rapidly to meet 
disaster demands even under circumstances that are quite severe. The 
present study suggests that emergencies call for role-making as part and 
parcel to maintaining the viability of the community. Perhaps the most 
interesting example of this point are the findings for formal 
preparedness. Preparedness increases role-playing early in the enactment 
of organization, serving as a source of continuity by defining expected 
actions. But as the enactment unfolds preparedness becomes a resource for 
improvisation through role-making. This is the goal Dynes, Quarantelli, 
and Kreps had in mind when they argued that planning should be flexible
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and continuous rather formal and episodic.
The remaining management principles discussed by Kreps are based on 
the total sample of 423 cases, but absent of direct evidence on 
role-making and role-playing. Each relevant principle is listed and this 
is followed by a discussion of how the present study informs it.
Organization can be distinguished from other types of social
structure by the co-presence of domains (D), tasks (T), human
and material resources (R), and activities (A). Knowing the 
difference between organization and other things social is the 
theoretical foundation of emergency management.
While organization is something which can be sought and achieved by 
those involved in emergency management, hazards managers must distinguish 
between it and other forms of human association. The findings suggest 
that what might appear as confusion, or worse, is really a quite natural
and necessary process of adjustment. Role-making exists to some degree,
at every stage of origins. Not to be feared as disorder, it is better 
seen as order blending with action. Stated theoretically, the data 
suggest that improvisation reveals the autonomy and unity that is social 
structure. In Durkheim's words, structure is always there yet constantly 
becoming and changing. If "attainment of organization is a relevant 
management objective" (Kreps, 1985, p.217), it is critical for hazards 
managers to have a conception of organization that is appropriate to the 
emergency setting. The argument here is that the subtleties of 
organization are best revealed by treating it as developing process.
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There are alternative but not an unlimited number of paths to 
the attainment of organization following disasters. Hazards 
managers should assume that all 24 patterns of origins 
represented in the theory are possible and, depending on the 
characteristics of impacts, each may be appropriate and 
effective.
Only 6 of the 24 possible organizational forms (as defined by Kreps) 
are examined in this thesis. These 6 forms represent a balancing of the 
forces of action and order. Thus all of the 38 cases are instances of 
organization, yet none is biased toward action or order as Kreps defines 
his metric. This does not mean that they are any more or less effective 
than the remaining 18 four element forms. But they make clear Kreps' 
point that organizing in disaster is not a chaotic process that needs to 
be or, indeed, can be rigidly controlled. What is evidenced as 
role-making is not necessarily counterproductive and more likely reflects 
a necessary adaptiveness. The findings of the present work support Kreps' 
earlier conclusion: things do not just happen. What evolves during a
disaster is patterned responses. No one pattern is universally more 
appropriate and each is a viable form of organization. The patterns are 
different in important ways and, in some sense, each instance of a pattern 
is unique. Yet all instances share a distinctiveness as organization. 
While the enactment of organization should not (and probably 
cannot) be forced into any particular pattern, disaster 
preparedness increases the chance that (1) domains and tasks 
will be more clearly defined and (2) immediate demands of the
emergency period will be addressed in more timely fashion. The
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proper role of preparedness is to augment natural processes of 
organizing without unnecessarily distorting what takes place.
As indicated in the present work, disaster preparedness initially 
enhances role-playing. Social expectations guide behavior early in the 
organizing process. This supports Kreps' argument that "the necessarily 
modest but important contribution of disaster preparedness is clarity in 
the organizing process" (1985, p.223). However, planning and training 
need not be equated with rigid control. Rather, the findings show that as 
a response evolves formal preparedness becomes associated with 
improvisation m  the form of role-making. Not isolated role-making but in 
tandem with ongoing role-playing. The implication I draw is that flexible 
preparedness serves to tailor responses to the unique demands of the 
situation. The contribution of planning then, extends beyond Kreps'
notion of clarity by augmenting the processes of organizing. The rise and
fall of particular instances of organization is not the key 
concern of emergency management at community, regional, or 
national levels of response. The more important objective at 
these levels is coordination of networks of responding social 
units. An appropriate emergency management role is to 
facilitate coordination by being a source or conduit of
information about hazards, what is needed, and what is
available.
The relevance of social networks is clearly evidenced by the findings 
from the present study. Self-contained responses enhance clarity through 
role-playing. Those enacting units operating in more complex networks 
show greater evidence of some strain toward role-making. Improvisation in
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the absence ol a facilitating communications network smacks of confusion. 
The information conduit role that Kreps argues for hazards management is 
in accord with the historical concept of coordination in that field. 
Emergent networks themselves are a particularly important indication of 
role-making and, as Kreps shows, are a part of the organizing process. 
Hazards managers must be cognizant of and sensitive to these usually 
short-lived but critically important instances of structure, most of which 
are non-organizationai forms of association. Emergency management can 
facilitate these networks by providing information about what is needed 
and what is available.
Efficient and effective emergency management requires equal 
attention to organizational and non-organizational forms of 
association in disaster. The achievement of organization must 
be seen as part of a broader strategy of facilitating 
coordination among and between networks of social units.
The present research concentrates only on selected types of 
organizational forms of association in disaster. Each form is interpreted 
as a process of origins. The results indicate that each progressive stage 
of origins is influenced by earlier stages, but also unique with respect 
to each new element added. Regardless of whether organization is 
ultimately achieved or not, the findings suggest that nonorganizational 
forms of 1, 2, or 3 elements present are relevant and important to the 
community's overall emergency response. Recall also the significant 
impact of social networks on the process of organization. The networks 
can be described on their own terms as forms of association and each two 
unit relationship within them can be as well (Francis and Kreps, 1984).
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In either case, links among discrete instances of organization implicate 
Kreps' elements of organization in various ways which can be described and 
which imply varying degrees of coordination. Coordination is an important 
concept in emergency management circles but it lacks specificity. Kreps' 
and my findings suggest that it is best thought of as part of an 
organizing process, not organization itelf.
To conclude, my research offers the concept of role as a key 
dimension of social structure and disaster. Specifically, role analysis 
has provided a fruitful way of examining action, order, and their unity in 
organization. The paradox of social structure— i.e., the autonomy and 
unity of action and order— is uniquely represented in classical sociology 
by the works of Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim expresses the paradox as a 
problem of order. Weber express it as a problem of action. Their 
respective insights on order and action remain central for contemporary 
sociology. Here they guide our understanding of role-making and 
role-playing as two sides of the same coin. Kreps' interpretation of 
action and order was built on the foundations of the classics. The 
present study suggests that his resulting theory of organization becomes 
more analytically powerful by exploiting the concept of role. The result, 
I hope, is a clearer picture of what goes on in disaster.
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APPENDIX 1: Marginal Distributions of
Role-Making and Role-Playing Criteria
Criterion Scores
Criterion 1
Criterion 2
Criterion 3
Criterion 4
Element Stages 
2 3
Totals
1 11 3 2 - 16
2 6 6 11 2 25
3 20 28 25 36 109
9 1 1 - - 2
1 6 2 1 1 10
2 13 17 19 9 58
3 lb 18 17 27 80
9 1 1 1 1 4
1 14 4 - - 18
2 5 9 14 - 28
3 19 24 24 38 105
9 - 1 - - 1
1 - 2 - - 2
2 11 4 8 8 31
3 23 29 28 30 110
9 4 3 2 - 9
Totals 152 152 152 152
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. ROLe I 1.00 -.87 -.10 .89 .72 -.58 .71 .41 .11
2. ROLElA 1.00 -.41 -.54 -.63 .43 -.59 -.52 -.18
3. ROLElB 1.00 -.54 -.05 .20 -.13 .29 .16
4. ROLE1C 1.00 .63 -.58 .66 .21 .02
5. ROLE2 1.00 -.68 .93 .49 .21
6. ROLE2A 1.00 -.90 -.38 .11
7. ROLE2B 1.00 .48 .72
8. R0LE3 1.00 .25
9. ROLE4 1.00
10. DCON
11. TCUN
12. RCON
13. ACON
14. ELSTAGE1
15. FOT
16. SIZ 
17 . PLANN 
lb. RTSTR
19. VLOSS
20. CDMGE
MEAN 2.13 .29 .29 .42 2.50 .39 .55 2.50 11.42
STD. DEV. .84 .46 .46 .50 .60 .50 .50 .50 .86
10 
.13 
-.13 
.01 
.11 
.19 
-.30 
.26 
.03 
-.01 
1.00
1.71
.84
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables Continued
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 . ROLEl -.29 -.01 .11 .65 .10 -.03 .27 -.28 -.13 .06
2. R0LE1A .37 .01 -.13 -.71 -.14 -.02 -.13 .29 .16 -.11
3. ROLEIB -.23 .01 .06 .22 .09 .09 -.25 -.06 -.08 .13
4. ROLElC -.14 -.01 .06 .45 .04 -.06 .34 -.21 -.07 -.01
5. ROLE 2 -.28 .03 .07 .40 .18 -.04 .18 -.22 -.32 .09
6. ROLE2A .16 .10 .08 -.25 -.01 .07 -.06 .27 .21 -.05
7. ROLE2B -.24 -.03 .01 .36 .11 -.06 .14 -.26 -.29 .08
8. R0LE3 -.27 .04 -.33 .26 .11 .39 -.22 -.16 -.05 .00
9. R0LE4 -.26 -.01 -.03 -.05 -.03 .20 .01 .00 -.04 -.20
10. DCON .12 -.05 .11 .20 -.05 -.08 .27 .03 .04 -.07
11. TOON 1.00 .27 .02 -.31 .02 -.28 .14 .27 -.10 .11
12. RCON 1.00 .35 .13 .31 -.25 .22 .04 .06 -.06
13. ACUN 1.00 .19 .22 -.31 .46 -.03 0.01 .16
14. EL STAG El 1.00 .22 -.11 .14 -.26 .03 -.03
15. FOT 1.00 .08 .37 .00 .12 -.15
16. SIZ 1.00 -.06 .10 .24 -.20
17. PL ANN 1.00 .11 .06 -.10
18. RTSTR 1.00 .05 .00
19. VLOSS 1.00 -.51
•
oCM CDMGE 1.00
STD.
MEAN
DEV.
1.76
.88
1.45
.69
2.18
.90
.55
.50
.47
.50
2.58
1.08
1.37
.49
1.50
.51
.61
.50
.63
.50
99
APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables Continued
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1 . ROLEl .35 -.37 -.40 .06 -.07 -.18 -.03 -.17 .25 -.22
2. R0LE1A -.34 .26 .36 -.07 .19 .22 .06 .15 -.23 .14
3. ROLElB .03 .17 .01 .04 -.26 -.12 -.07 .00 .01 .14
4. ROLElC .28 -.39 -.34 .03 .06 -.10 .01 -.14 .21 -.25
3. ROLE2 .23 -.16 -.49 .00 -.02 .06 .00 .06 .00 -.10
6. R0LE2A -.13 .14 .36 -.03 -.03 .04 .09 .11 .06 .17
7. R0LE2B .20 -.17 -.47 .02 .00 .02 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.14
8. R0LE3 .17 -.04 -.16 .11 -.38 -.23 .11 .07 .22 .20
9. R0LE4 .03 .04 -.01 -.11 -.14 .19 -.06 .08 -.33 .23
10. DCON .05 .09 -.20 -.15 .05 .10 .04 -.25 -.14 -.08
11. TCON -.31 .32 .12 -.14 .09 .12 .21 .03 -.02 .05
12. RCON -.07 .01 .11 -.01 -.23 -.09 -.U5 -.19 .02 -.01
13. ACON .04 .01 -.19 .24 -.13 .15 .01 -.28 -.03 -.09
14. ELSTAGE1 .54 -.48 -.36 .02 -.25 -.29 -.04 -.29 .19 -.47
15. FOT .32 -.28 -.32 .37 -.32 -.10 -.04 .04 .40 -.03
16. SIZ .34 -.21 -.09 .04 -.05 -.17 -.06 .13 .21 .42
17. PL ANN .25 -.27 -.36 .01 -.07 .23 -.07 -.20 .24 -.07
18. RTSTR .06 .04 .16 -.11 .08 .18 .34 .20 .11 .20
19. VLOSS .24 -.22 .08 .14 .03 -.09 .15 -.11 .28 .16
•
oCM CDMGE -.14 .19 .03 .10 -.04 -.01 .19 .20 -.02 -.01
MEAN .34 .82 .45 .42 2.24 2.55 .68 .82 .63 2.13
STD. DEV. .48 .69 .50 .50 1.05 1.03 .47 .39 .49 .66
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables Continued
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
21. PINT 1.00 -.86 -.65 .17 -.22 -.12 .01 -.09 .32 -.06
22. INLINKS 1.00 .48 -.24 .17 .11 .15 .07 -.37 .11
23. ITLINKS 1.00 -.12 .15 -.18 .16 .02 -.19 .06
24. LOC 1.00 -.19 .01 .24 .27 .21 .24
25. INTIME 1.00 .30 -.23 .11 -.30 -.08
26. EVENTTP 1.00 -.02 .12 -.34 .25
27. EVENT-MS 1.00 .26 .07 .31
28. DOM-TP 1.00- .08 .41
29. COMM 1.00 .15
30. C-EXP 1.00
STD.
MEAN
DEV.
.34
.48
.82
.69
.45
.50
.42
.50
2.24
1.05
2.55
1.03
.68
.47
.82
.39
.63
.49
2.13
.66
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RESPONSE //
ELEMENT CODES: ROLE-MAKING— ROLE-PLAYING CRITERIA
Score indications: 1 - role-making dominates
2 - mix role-making and role-playing
3 - role-playing dominates 
9 - uncertain
Role boundary expansion versus unique role performance:
1-unique role performance, role-making dominates
2=mix of unique role performance and role boundary expansion
3=role boundary expansion, role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
ELI* EL2= EL3= EL4=
Continuity versus discontinuity of pre- and post-impact 
role relationships:
l=discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role 
relationships, role-making dominates 
2=mix of discontinuity and continuity of pre- and post­
impact role relationships 
3=continuity of pre- and post-impact role 
relationships, role-playing dominates
ELI* EL2= EL3= EL4=
Homogeneity versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants: 
l=roles homogeneous, role-making dominates 
2=roles heterogeneous with undefined task structure 
3=roles heterogeneous with defined task structure, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
ELI* EL2= EL3= EL4=
Consistency versus inconsistency of pre- and post­
disaster status/role:
l=pre- and post-disaster status/role inconsistent, 
role-making dominates 
2=mix of inconsistent and consistent pre- and 
post-disaster status/role 
3=pre- and post-disaster status/role consistent, 
role-playing dominates 
9=uncertain
ELI* EL2= EL3= EL4=
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ORGANIZATION, ROLE, AND DISASTER
CODEBOOK
ITEM COLUMNS
Organized disaster response number: RESPN 3 (1-3)
Event number: EVENT-MS 2 (4-5)
Event tvne: EVENTTP 1 (6)
1 = earthquake
2 = tornado
3 = flood
4 = hurricane
Domain type: DOM-TP 2 (7-b)
1 = hazard-vulnerability analysis
2 - maintenance of standby human and material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and training
4 *= public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 « issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = providing victim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 - damage and needs assessments and inventory
of available resources
17 = damage control
lb = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
26 = resumption ot other social institutions
2/ = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 » reconstruction planning
29 = other
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Element presence at first stage of 1 (9)
organization: ELSTAGE1
1 = D
2 = T
3 = R
4 = A
Composite action/order criteria score 1 (10)
at tirst stage: A/01
Description:
Element presence at second stage of 
organization: ELSTAGE2
1 = DA
2 = TR
3 = RD
4 = RT
5 = AD
6 = TA
Composite action/order criteria score 
at second stage: A/02
Description:
Element presence at third stage of 1 (13)
organization: ELSTAGE3
1 = DAR
2 = TRA
3 = RDA
4 = RTD
5 = ADT
6 = TAD
Composite action/order criteria score 1 (14)
at third stage: A/03
Description:
Element presence at fourth stage of 1 (15)
organization: ELSTAGE4
1 = DART
2 = TRAD
3 = RDAT
4 = RTDA
5 = ADTR
6 = TADR
1 (11)
1 (12)
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Composite action/order criteria score 
at tourth stage: A/04
1 = role-making dominates
2 = mix role-making and role-playing
3 = role-playing dominates 
9 = uncertain
Description:
Domain definition problem: DOMPR
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Domain definition problem at origins: DCON
1 = no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Task definition problem: TASKPR
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Task definition problem at origins: TCON
1 * no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Resource mobilization problem: RESPR
1 «* absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain
1 (16)
1 (17)
1 (18)
1 (19)
1 (20)
1 (21)
Description:
i(b
Resource mobilization problem at origins: RCON 1 (22)
1 = no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins 
9 = uncertain
Activity performance problem: ACTPR 1 (23)
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:
Activity performance problem at origins: ACON 1 (24)
1 * no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins 
9 - uncertain
Type of focal organization: FOT 1 (25)
1 = emergency relevant public bureaucracy
2 = other public bureaucracy
3 = emergency relevant voluntary agencies
4 = special interest groups
5 = private firms
6 - emergent groups of individuals
7 = emergent groups of other groups
and organizations
8 = military unit
9 = other
Response task structure: RTSTR 1 (26)
1 = simple
2 = complex
9 = uncertain
Initiation of organized disaster response: PINT 1 (27)
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 - boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
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If boundary spanning at intiation of 1 (28)
response links are: ITLINKS
1 = established prior to disaster by planning
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable 
9 = uncertain
Number of organizational links at 1 (29)
initiation: INLINKS
0 = none 
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3
3 = uncertain
Evidence of pre-planning prior to response: PLANN 1 (30)
1 = no pre-planning
2 = pre-planning evidenced 
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization: SIZ 1 (31)
1 = 9 or fewer
2 =  10 -  20
3 = 21 - 50
4 ■= over 50
9 = uncertain
Community disaster experience in past 1 (32)
10 years: C-EXP
1 = no disasters, few if any threats
2 = no disasters, several threats
3 = one or more disasters
4 = one or more disasters and several threats 
9 = uncertain
Community (rural-urban): COMM 1 (33)
1 = rural area
2 = urban 10,000 or less
3 = urban 10,000 - 25,000
4 = urban 25,000 - 50,000
5 = urban metropolitan, 50,000+
Physical location relative to primary 1 (34)
impact area: LOC
1 = close
2 = peripheral
Time of initiation: INTIME 1 (35)
1 = 1 - 2  hours pre- or post-impact
2 = 3 -  24 hours pre- or post-impact
3 = 25 -  72 hours pre- or post-impact
4 = 72+ hours pre- or post-impact 
9 = uncertain
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Factors drawn upon by participants to sustain communication 
among participants and relevant others include • . .
Victim losses, emotional« structural, 1 (36)
material): VLOSS
1 = no
2 = yes
9 ** uncertain
Overall community damage: CDMGE 1 (37)
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
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